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The Case for Limiting Judicial Review of
Labor Board Certification Decisions

by Michael C. Harper*

Judicial presumptions concerning legislative intent often resonate as compelling directives to legislators, especially when it is
suggested that the presumptions may be mandated by the Constitution. The presumption developed by the judiciary in this century that Congress intends most decisions of executive bureaus to
be reviewable by the judiciary provides an excellent example.'
This presumption has been reinforced by suggestions in some
Supreme Court decisions, 2 as well as by the eloquent pleas of a few
Copyright © 1987 by Michael C. Harper.
* Professor of Law, Boston University, A.B., 1970; J.D., 1973, Harvard
University.
For helpful and supportive comments, whether or not heeded, I wish to thank Ira
Lupu, Paul Weiler, Ted St. Antoine, and Henry Monaghan.
1. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (observing that
"judicial review of a final agency action... will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress"); see also Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 2135-36 (1986); Lindahl v.
Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 772-73 (1985); Dunlop v. Bachowski,
421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410
(1971); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970).
But see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (concluding that "an agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review"); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206-08 (1982) (implying
nonreviewability from the conspicuous absence of a review provision in one part of a
statute).
2. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
69-70 & n.23 (1982) (four Justice plurality) (holding that certain common law actions
must be heard by Article III rather than Article I tribunals); Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 366 (1974) (stating that a construction of a statutory provision as barring
federal courts from deciding the constitutionality of the legislation would raise serious
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influential academics,3 that judicial review of at least some administrative decisions may be constitutionally mandated. The effect
of this presumption has not only been on judicial consideration of
whether to review executive actions taken under particular legislative authority.4 It has also defined what legislators and other
legal architects view as plausible alternative systems for implementing their social and political goals.
The restrictions imposed on plausible legislation by this presumption in favor of judicial review have been excessive. The presumption can obscure vision of those legislative systems that
would most effectively achieve the substantive social goals of
elected representatives. Moreover, in some situations this obstruction cannot be justified by either the protection of individual
statutory rights or the maintenance of constitutionally
based
5
structural limitations on governmental power.
How the presumption in favor of judicial review restricts legislative vision is well illustrated by the attention given in recent decades by friends of collective bargaining to the reform of
American labor-management relations law. Both the percentage
of American workers represented by unions and the success of unions in certification elections have declined in recent decades.6 In
questions concerning the constitutionality of the provision); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (stating that although judicial review of nonconstitutional fact findings is not required, "full authority to the court to deal with matters of law" must be
reserved). For further support, see Justice Brandeis's celebrated dictum, concurring
in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936):
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have
some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted
regularly. To that extent, the person asserting a right, whatever its
source, should be entitled to the independent judgment of a court on the
ultimate question of constitutionality.
Id. at 84.
3. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 381-89 (1965);
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1374-86 (1953); Katz, Federal Legislative Courts,
43 HARv. L. REV. 894, 912-24 (1930). For further academic discussion, see Currie,
Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary,16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 462-65
(1983), and Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern
Pipeline Decision,1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 226-28, both arguing that Article III should be
read to demand an independent judicial consideration of all federal decisions to which
"judicial power" could extend.
4. See, e.g., Robison, 415 U.S. at 366-67; Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122
(1946); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34 (1939).
5. Some blending of these two justifications forms the basis for arguments that
the presumption is constitutionally compelled. See, L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 336.
6. The decline of union membership generally has been steady, from a peak of
almost 39% of private, nonagricultural workers in 1955 to less than 25% in 1978. See
R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 222 (1984). The latest statistics
indicate that the trend is continuing. In 1980, union members accounted for 24% of
total civilian employment. See id. at 221. By 1984 the percentage of union members
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response, political representatives and academic commentators
have developed a number of proposals to reform the National La-

bor Relations Act (the Act). 7 For those who wish to encourage
collective bargaining, many of these wide-ranging proposals
should be compelling.8 Yet, given the amount of political and intellectual energy that has been devoted to these reform proposals,
it is noteworthy that no one has suggested the transformation of
one of the Act's most glaring anomalies - the system for obtaining judicial review of National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) decisions to certify or not to certify a particular union as
the bargaining representative of a unit of employees.
Although the transformation of this system would not be the
only - or even the most effective - potential reformation of the
Act for encouraging collective bargaining, it certainly seems an
important step that American labor law reformers should wish to
take. This is true because of two interrelated realities. First, judicial review of Board certification decisions has almost always been
available to employers that wish to avoid collective bargaining, but
it has seldom been available to unions that wish to obtain representative status.9 While this state of affairs derives in part from
the technical intricacies of labor law practice, it is aggravated by a
second truth: the substantial delays that accompany judicial review in practice almost always make it less likely that a collective
bargaining relationship will be established, regardless of whether
the reviewing court upholds the Board's decisions. Common sense
analysis, anecdotal evidence, and empirical studies1 ° indicate that
the longer union organizers must wait to show employees that the
gains of collective bargaining are worth the risks of their
had fallen to 18.8% of those employed and by 1985 to 18.0%. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS 213 (1986).
The decline in union membership reflects the unions' lack of success in certification
elections. In 1950, unions were winning almost three out of every four elections. By
1980 the union victory rate had fallen to below 50%. Union victories in 1950 organized
almost two percent of the nonagricultural work force, while union victories in 1980
organized less than one fourth of one percent of the work force, much less than the
loss of union jobs. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776 (1983). Professor Paul
Weiler compiled his data from annual reports of the National Labor Relations Board.
See also R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra, at 224-28 (citing empirical evidence indicating that broad economic trends do not fully explain the decline in union membership);
Dickens & Leonard, Accounting for the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-1980, 38
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 323 (1984) (same).
7. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
8. Several of these proposals were embodied in reform legislation passed by the
House of Representatives, but rejected by the Senate in 1978. See S. 2467, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 23,712 (1977). See
generally Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1 (1979)
(reviewing the effectiveness of various reform proposals).
Other proposals have been advanced in independent commentary, including two
noteworthy articles by Professor Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contractand the Prospectsfor Union Representation,98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 404-16 (1984),
and Weiler, supra note 6, at 1804-19. For a more detailed discussion of the proposals,
see infra note 132.
9. See infra notes 35-89 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
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employer taking hostile actions against union adherents, the less
likely it is that an ever-shifting set of employees will see the organizational struggles through to a first contract.
Given this second truth, even removing all technical legal barriers to unions seeking judicial review of Board decisions in a certification dispute would not make judicial review as useful for those
trying to establish collective bargaining as for those resisting it.
To minimize judicial review of Board certification decisions as a
factor in discouraging collective bargaining, review itself would
have to be minimized.
The fact that labor law reformers over the past two decades
have not proposed a sharp confinement of judicial review of Board
certification decisions does not reflect ignorance of how judicial
review impedes collective bargaining. Labor law reformers have
advocated granting the Board authority to order employers to
compensate employees for the wages and benefits lost during the
period of the employer's delay of the commencement of bargaining - including the period occasioned by litigation in the courts. 1
This "make-whole" remedy has in part been justified as a deterrent to employer appeals of Board bargaining orders that are
sought merely to dissipate union strength by delaying bargaining.12 Furthermore, the labor law reform legislation that passed
the House in 1978, as well as that defeated in the Senate, directed
the courts to give more narrow review to Board determinations in
certification disputes than previously provided by some lower federal courts. 13 Committee reports suggest that these provisions reflected an awareness that the system of judicial review has
inhibited the development of collective bargaining. 14
11. See, e.g., S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 8, 123 CONG. REc. 23,712 (1977); Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory
Remedy in Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059, 1063 (1968). The reformers were successful, at first, in convincing at least the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit that the Board has such authority under the present statute. See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d
1243, 1250-53 (D.C. Cir.) (Tiidee 1), cert denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). But a majority of
the Board has never been convinced that it has such authority, or that it would be
practical to use it, see, e.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970), and the D.C.
Circuit soon allowed the issue to wane, see International Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 359-60 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Tiidee II), cert denied,
421 U.S. 991 (1975). See also Winn-Dixie Stores v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343, 1352 (5th Cir.
1978) (rejecting the Board's attempt to grant a modified make-whole remedy).
12. See, e.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. at 115 (McCulloch & Brown, Members,
dissenting in part) (citing the advantage to the employer of the delay associated with
the Board's usual bargaining remedy); Schlossberg & Silard, supra note 11, at 1065-66
(stating that an employer's refusal to bargain in violation of federal law may enrich
him by defeating union morale and discouraging union membership and activities).
13. See S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-30 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 42-44 (1977).
14. See supra note 13.
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Given this awareness, the failure in recent decades to advocate a
major transformation of the present system of judicial review of
Board certification decisions seems to derive primarily from the
restrictions on legislative vision imposed by the presumption of
judicial review and its underlying political assumptions. Although
not able to verify this suspicion directly, I can nevertheless hope to
do something potentially more significant: to establish, for those
who remain sympathetic to the original goals of the Act, a strong
case for the sharp restriction of judicial review of Board certification decisions. Such a case should convince all readers, regardless
of their views concerning collective bargaining, that judicial review may frustrate legitimate substantive policy aspirations. The
presumption of judicial review may require significant qualification, at least as an influence on legislators, and perhaps on judges
as well.
Part I of this Article explains in more technical detail the effects of the present system of judicial review of Board certification
decisions and how that system developed. Part II argues that this
review should be sharply curtailed, suggesting that unless a court
is able to rule that the Board has rendered a certification decision
for an improper motive, it should reconsider that decision only to
the extent it involves a constitutional issue, a narrow jurisdictional issue, or one of a few bounded technical issues. Such a curtailment of review should be embraced by all who remain
sympathetic to the original goals of the Act - those who believe
that collective bargaining can be beneficial to employees and the
economy generally and who believe that the freedom of employees to select, as well as reject, collective bargaining should be protected effectively. Finally, Part III explains why sharply
curtailing judicial review is consistent with a proper constitutional
balancing of governmental power.
Although its exclusive focus is the reformation of one aspect of
American labor law, this Article should help encourage an important general debate on the role of judicial review of administrative
decisions. Labor law reform illustrates why aborting that debate
by automatically invoking an unexamined presumption in favor of
review can unnecessarily frustrate the achievement of rational,
substantive legislative goals.
L

A.

The PresentEffects and Past Development of Judicial
Review of Labor Board CertificationDecisions
The CertificationResponsibilities of the Board

Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act vests the National
Labor Relations Board with one of its two primary responsibilities: the certification of unions as exclusive bargaining representatives for units of employees that the Board deems "appropriate
[VOL. 55:262
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for the purposes of collective bargaining.' 1 5 Certification of a par-

ticular representative is granted whenever a majority of employees in an appropriate unit has chosen in a secret ballot election to
be so represented. Unions and employers are interested in the
Board's certifications because of the Board's second primary responsibility: to enforce proscriptions of statutorily defined unfair
labor practices, including an employer's refusal "to bargain collec16
tively" with a certified representative of its employees.
Although an employer may recognize as a bargaining representative an uncertified union that has the support of a majority
of em17
ployees, the employer has no legal obligation to do so.

Because of the legal importance of certification, both unions and
employers, as well as employees, may object to any of a series of
decisions made by the Board or its delegates as part of the total
process of determining whether to certify. First, the Board decides whether it has jurisdiction to certify. It asks whether the
employees whom the union seeks to represent, as well as their
employer, are within the Act's definitions of employee and employer.' 8 The Board also asks whether the employer has sufficient
impact on commerce to meet the Board's discretionary limits on
its own jurisdiction. 19 Second, the Board determines whether the
unit of employees that the union wishes to represent is appropriate for bargaining, 20 primarily by judging whether all the employees within it have enough "community of interest" to make
15. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)-(b) (1982).
16. Id.§ 158(a)(5). The Act similarly proscribes refusals "to bargain collectively"
with an employer by unions selected as bargaining representatives. Id. § 158(b)(3).
17. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). An
employer may not recognize a union that does not have the support of a majority of
employees. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961).
18. The definition of employer, which excludes federal and state governments
and their subdivisions as well as persons subject to the Railway Labor Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1982), and the definition of employee, which excludes agricultural and domestic workers, independent contractors and supervisors, id. § 152(3), provide the major jurisdictional limits in the Act.
19. The Board does not have jurisdiction when the representational dispute is not
one "affecting commerce." See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982); see also NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1937) (holding that action must affect commerce to lie within the authority conferred upon the Board). The statutory standard
for "affecting commerce" is relatively easy to meet. See NLRB v. National Survey
Serv., 361 F.2d 199,203 (7th Cir. 1966) (recognizing that the Board's power is commensurate with Congress's broad power under the Commerce Clause). However, the
Board has also exercised its statutory power, under 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1982), to
publish discretionary standards limiting its own jurisdiction to employers whose dollar amounts of business revenue reflect a minimum impact on commerce. For a comprehensive presentation of the Board's standards, see J. FEERICK, H. BAER & J. ARFA,
NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 659-71 (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter FEERICK & BAER].
20. See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 417-418 (1950), enforced,
190 F.2d 576, 584 (7th Cir. 1951).
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bargaining effective. 2 1 Third, the Board must find a minimal
showing of employee support for a union (generally 30%, by the
Board's self-imposed parameter) before concluding that the cost of
an election is justified. 22 Next, the Board determines whether
there is a technical bar to an election, such as the existence of a
valid collective bargaining agreement, 23 the proximity of a past
election or certification, 24 or the pendency of serious unfair labor
25
practice charges.
After deciding to hold an election, the Board must determine
which employees will be eligible to vote. These judgments overlap
those of defining both jurisdiction and an appropriate unit, but
they are also complicated by factors such as employee turnover,
layoffs, and part-time hours. 26 The Board also determines
whether a certification election already conducted has been invalidated by any employer or union unfair labor practice or by other
conduct suggesting that the election results do not express the
true and uninhibited sentiments of the unit.27 The Act defines an
employer's or a union's coercion of an employee's decision on collective bargaining as an unfair labor practice, 28 and the Board will
overturn elections because of such illegal behavior.2 9 The Board
21. See, e.g., Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962).
22. NLRB Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1986).
23. See Appalachian Shale Prods., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1163 (1958).
24. The Act precludes holding an election within one year of a previous "valid
election." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982). The Board has maintained a policy of refusing
to consider certification petitions, absent unusual circumstances, for one year after
the certification of a bargaining representative. See, e.g., Centr-O-Cast & Eng'r Co.,
100 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1508 (1952); see also Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1954)
(approving Board refusal to accept even good-faith employer rejections of bargaining
representatives within a year after their certification). When an employer voluntarily
recognizes a union, the Board requires the recognition to last long enough to test the
viability of bargaining, usually one year. See, e.g., Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157
N.L.R.B. 583, 586 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Town & Country, 194 N.L.R.B. 1135, 1135 (1972). The Board also will
hold election proceedings in abeyance if an unfair labor practice charge that suggests a
fair election cannot be held is filed after the filing of the election petition. NLRB,
CASEHANDLING MANUAL: REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS pt.2, at 11,730.1 (1975). But
see Suratt v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 1972) (limiting the Board's power to
hold election petitions in abeyance when statutory rights are clearly jeopardized);
Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064, 1069 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).
26. Generally, employees on layoff, probationary, part-time, or seasonal status
may vote, provided they have a reasonable expectation of continued employment and
a substantial common interest with full-time, currently employed workers. See generally FEERICK & BAER,supra note 19, at 414-16; R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 43 (1976). The Board also has had
to develop a doctrine governing the voting eligibility of strikers and their replacements in light of section 9(c)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982), which provides
that the Board may make permanently replaced economic strikers eligible to vote in
any election held within twelve months after commencement of the strike.
27. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) ("In election proceedings,
it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees.").
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (1982).
29. See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962) (stating that
"[clonduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) is, afortior4 conduct which interferes with the
exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election").
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has also decided that certain activity during elections, such as racially inflammatory speech ° and certain misrepresentations,3 1 can
prevent those elections from being valid
even if the activity does
32
not constitute an unfair labor practice.
These components of the certification decision provide employ-

ers or unions with numerous theoretical bases for seeking review.
The Board's establishment and implementation of processes to
consider these components, moreover, offer an additional set of
procedural grounds for an appeal. Section 9 of the Act itself im-

poses few restraints on the decision making processes that the

Board must employ. 33 Reviewing courts, however, have increasingly found such restraints in the Board's internal, procedural reg34
ulations and even in the due process clause of the Constitution.
30. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71 (1962) (stating that "appeals to racial
prejudice on matters unrelated to the election issues... have no place in the Board
electoral campaigns").
31. The Board's regulation of campaign misrepresentations has been especially
inconstant. Under its decisions in Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962),
overturned in Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1314 (1977), and General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 623 (1978), overturned in Midland Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 129 (1982), the Board has set aside elections "where there
has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which involves a
substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the other party or
parties from making an effective reply...." Hollywood Ceramics,140 N.L.R.B. at 224.
See also General Kni4 239 N.L.R.B. at 223 (stating the Board's intention to adhere
strictly to Hollywood Ceramics, which "assures the public that the Board will not
tolerate substantial and material misrepresentations made in the final hours" of a
union election campaign). During the short-lived Shopping Kart regime and under
the currently controlling Midland National standard, the Board overturns elections
only because of representations made in a fraudulent manner, not because of the substance of such representations. Midland Nationa4 263 N.L.R.B. at 133; Shopping
Kar4 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313-14.
32. The Board has long asserted the power to overturn elections because of conduct that would not necessarily constitute an unfair labor practice. See General Shoe
Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). This position is especially important in light of
section 8(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982), which provides that a mere expression of views or opinions that contain no threats of reprisals or promises of benefit
cannot constitute an unfair labor practice. See Sonoco Prods. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 835,
838 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that speech not constituting an unfair labor practice can be
the basis for overturning an election).
33. Section 9(c)(1) directs the Board to investigate certification petitions filed by
unions, employees, or employers to determine if there is "reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists" and if it does, to "provide
for an appropriate hearing upon due notice." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982). The Board
is then directed to hold "an election by secret ballot" if it "finds upon the record of
such hearing that such a question of representation exists." Id. The Supreme Court
has confirmed that "Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free
choice of bargaining representatives by employees." NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329
U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
34. The Act is totally silent on the extent to which, or even whether, the Board
must consider objections to the results of a certification election. The Board, however, does consider such objections under specific, codified regulations. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.69 (1986). These regulations provide for a hearing on postelection objections
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B.

The Imbalance of Review

The decisions involved in the certification process and the legal
importance of certification seem likely to engender a large
number of judicial opinions on the adequacy of the Board's certifications and of its refusals to proceed to certification. In fact, employers do obtain judicial review of a significant number of
certification decisions. 35 Employers regularly challenge, often
successfully, 36 almost all types of decisions rendered during the
certification process. Only the Board's findings of minimal employee support warranting an election seem to be securely within
37
its discretion as unreviewable.
The judicial review record for unions, however, is far from comparable. Indeed, judicial review of union objections to Board certification decisions is almost nonexistent. 38 A small portion of the
only when the "regional director concludes [they] raise substantial and material fac-

tual issues." Id. § 102.69(d). Several circuit courts interpreting this regulation have
demanded that the Board provide hearings on postelection complaints. See, e.g., ARA
Servs. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 936, 937 (4th Cir. 1983); Eliason Corp. v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 22,
23 (6th Cir. 1982); Bauer Welding and Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 314,
321 (8th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Bristol Spring Mfg. Co., 579 F.2d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
Some courts have suggested that such hearings may be necessary to provide objecting
employers constitutional due process, see, e.g., NLRB v. Claxton Mfg., 613 F.2d 1364,
1365, modified, 618 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980), even though the employer's constitutionally protected interest in certification elections is unclear, see NLRB v. ARA Servs.,
717 F.2d 57, 67 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the sort of factual investigation required by
due process depends on a number of variables); Farber, Comment. Proceduresfor
Resolving Objections to NLRB Elections, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 255, 278-84 (1984)
(stressing that the Labor Act protects employee free choice and effectively eclipses
any employer freedom to make unilateral decisions on certain employee-related
topics).
35. Those who follow the development of labor law would not doubt this statement, and empirical research is confirmatory. According to the Board's records, during fiscal year 1985 employers obtained judicial review of approximately 30
certification decisions. During fiscal year 1984, employers obtained judicial review of
40 such decisions. Computer printout obtained from Elliot Moore, Director of Enforcement Litigation, NLRB (on file with author). A comprehensive survey of the
reported cases reprinted by Commerce Clearing House in volumes 73 to 102 of Labor
Cases, covering approximately the decade from mid-1974 to mid-1984, yielded 236 decisions in which courts reviewed employer objections to Board certifications.
36. A sample of decisions granting review to employers confirms that judicial review is not only available, but also meaningful for employers. For example, of the 236
decisions referred to in supra note 35, 81, or more than one-third, resulted in courts
refusing to affirm the Board's certification.
37. See Linden Lumber v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309 (1974) (holding that an employer cannot challenge the Board's determination that a sufficient showing of interest in a union exists among the employees to warrant an election). Indeed, because
employers are considered to have no legitimate concern in these determinations, the
Board has been held not to be obligated under the Freedom of Information Act to
disclose their evidentiary basis. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1183
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding that union representation cards, showing the sufficiency of
interest for an election, are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), because the serious invasion of employees' privacy that
would result is not counterbalanced by any significant public interest); Committee on
Masonic Homes of the R.W. Grand Lodge v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1977)
(same).
38. Research yielded one case decided between 1976 and 1985 affording a union
limited review of a Board representational decision. See Cannery Warehousemen v.
Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77, 80-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (granting review to support
Board's decision over that of arbitrator). In December 1985, all Commerce Clearing
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gap between employer and union cases may be due to the cost of
pressing an appeal; in a majority of cases, although by no means
all, employers have more funds to support litigation. Yet this
surely cannot fully explain the extreme rarity of judicial review of
union objections.
The disjunction between the number of employer appeals and
the number of union appeals from Board certification decisions
can only be understood by appreciating how Congress and the
courts have defined the availability of review. Neither Congress,
in passing the Act, nor the courts, in interpreting it, have expressed an intent to create an imbalance of review, but that has
been the undeniable effect.
The Act includes one provision, section 10(f), that expressly
grants aggrieved private parties access to the federal courts to review a Board action. 39 This provision, which provides entry directly to the Courts of Appeals, is limited to review of a "final
order of the Board, ' 40 however, and no decision of the Board in
the certification process is described by section 9 as a "final order."4 1 The only order to which section 9 alludes is an order resulting from a section 10(c) unfair labor act proceeding. 42 It was
thus easy for the Supreme Court in American Federationof Labor
(A.F.L.) v. NLRB 43 to hold that Board certification of an exclusive
bargaining representative is not reviewable in the circuit courts
through section 10(f). 44
The A.F.L. Court, however, did not preclude judicial review of
Board certification decisions for two reasons. First, section 9(d) of
the Act states that whenever a final order in a Board unfair labor
practice proceeding "is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation" of a request for certification, "such
certification and the record of such investigation" shall be included in the record of the unfair labor practice proceeding which
House Labor Case volumes and all Bureau of National Affairs Labor Relations Reference Manual volumes were perused, and a LEXIS search was conducted. The Board's
computerized records covering fiscal years 1984 and 1985 did not present one case in
which a union was able to obtain judicial review of the merits of a Board decision not
to certify. See also infra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing unions' failure to
obtain review by engaging in recognitional picketing).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
40. Id.
41. See ici § 159.

42. I& § 159(d).
43. 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
44. The Court relied on both the statutory language analysis suggested in the text,
id at 406-09, and the legislative history, id at 409-11. See aso NLRB v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 308 U.S. 413, 413-15 (1940) (companion case) (holding that
Board decision to direct an election antecedent to a possible certification is not reviewable under section 10(f)).
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must be transmitted for court review under section 10(f). 45

Although this language does not expressly provide for indirect
section 10 review of certification decisions supportive of unfair labor practice findings, Congress clearly intended it to provide such
review4 6 and the courts have so interpreted it.4 7

Moreover,

notwithstanding the focus in the language of section 9(d) on the
"investigation" of an election petition, circuit courts have not limited their review of certification decisions to determinations made
during such an investigation, such as whether an appropriate bargaining unit exists.4 8 They have also reviewed determinations
made by the Board totally apart from the investigation of a preelection petition, such as rulings on an employer's
claim that a
49
union's election tactics tainted the union's victory.

The second reason why the A.F.L. decision did not eliminate all
judicial review of Board certification decisions is that the Court
expressly declined to decide whether direct review not dependent
on the express review afforded by section 10(f) was available in
the district rather than the circuit courts. 50 Eighteen years later,
in its prominent Leedom v. Kyne5 1 decision, the Court addressed
this issue. The Court held that a union seeking to represent a unit
of only professional employees could obtain review of a Board decision certifying it as the representative of a unit of nine "nonprofessionals" as well as 233 "professional" employees. The Court
found that the circuit court was correct in overturning the certification as contrary to a clear and mandatory, specific prohibition in
52
the Act, and thus not within the Board's jurisdiction.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1982). Section 9(d) also provides for the inclusion of the
certification record in the record transmitted to a court considering, pursuant to section 10(e), a Board petition for enforcement of one of its unfair labor practice final
orders. Id.
46. The Senate Report on the original NLRA, the Wagner Act, stated that "the
entire election procedure becomes part of the record upon which the order of the
Board is based, and is fully reviewable by any aggrieved party in the Federal courts in
the manner provided in section 10." S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935),
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT 1935, at 2300, 2314 (1949).
47. The A.F.L. Court itself acknowledged this review mechanism. See 308 U.S. at
409-11.
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 327 F.2d 906, 909-11 (1964) (questioning factual findings made by the Board during the process of unit determination),
vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
49. See, e.g., NLRB v. Savair Mfg., 414 U.S. 270, 270-72 (1973) (affirming the court
of appeals' decision overturning the Board's determination that a preelection solicitation of memberships by a union with a promise to waive its initiation fee was consistent with a fair and free choice of bargaining representatives). But see NLRB v. ARA
Servs., 717 F.2d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 1983) (questioning jurisdiction to review issues arising
with respect to election procedures and observing that the Supreme Court has not
expressly ruled on the issue).
50. 308 U.S. at 404.
51. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
52. Id. at 188-89. The Court did so on the basis of a provision in section 9 stating
that the "Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate.., if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit."
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1982). The Board did not conduct amongst the professionals a
separate vote on inclusion of the nonprofessionals. 358 U.S. at 186.
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In dissent, Justice Brennan 53 - as well as Professor Archibald
Cox, commenting on the decision a few months later 54 - predicted that all Board certification decisions would be open to direct review after Kyne. They have not been. Direct district court
review of a handful of cases is attempted each year, but Board decisions are actually reviewed in few of these. 55 The lower courts'
generally narrow reading of Kyne authorizes direct review only
when the Board has abridged a seemingly clear and mandatory
restriction on its discretion under section 9.56 In Greyhound Corp.
53. 358 U.S. at 195-96. In his dissent, Justice Brennan explained that there was no
dispute about the nonprofessional as well as the professional employees being within
the jurisdiction of the Board, and he stated that the Board, in good faith, had interpreted the proviso to be inapplicable because it was intended only to protect professional employees from being submerged as a minority into a large unit of
nonprofessionals. Id. at 198. He therefore feared that the Kyne decision would serve
as the basis for a total frustration of Congress's intent to prevent direct review of
Board certification decisions. Id. at 196.
54. See Cox, The Major Labor Decisionsof the Supreme Court October Term 1958,
in 1959 PRocs. ABA SEC. LAB. REL. L. 23, 33-37 (arguing that the Kyne decision effectively renders reviewable all Board certifications).
55. The Board's own records of its litigation during the fiscal years from 1981
through 1985 disclose only 11 cases in which a party sought direct review of a Board
certification decision and only one case involving an employer's appeal, in which the
court claimed jurisdiction to review. Computer printout obtained from Aileen Armstrong, Assistant General Counsel, Appellate Counsel, Division of Litigation, NLRB
(on file with author). The few decisions in the past decade granting direct review do
not seem to represent abuses of judicial power. See, e.g., Cannery Warehousemen v.
Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77, 79-82 (9th Cir. 1980) (resolving a conflict in bargaining unit definition between Board and arbitrator in favor of Board); Florida Bd. of
Bus. Reg. v. NLRB, 497 F. Supp. 599, 602 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (stating that direct review is
allowed in exceptional circumstances and upholding Board assertion of jurisdiction
over jai alai industry), affd in partand vacated in par4 686 F.2d 1362, 1373 (11th Cir.
1982) (affirming court's jurisdiction, but holding that the district court had abused its
discretion), cert. denied sub nom. New York Racing Ass'n v. NLRB, 464 U.S. 914
(1983).
56. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Local 400 v. NLRB, 694 F.2d
276, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that the Board must have contravened "a specific and
unambiguous statutory directive" before its actions will come within the Kyne exception); Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n. v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492, 499-500 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (en banc) (holding the decision of the Board that members of house staffs are
not employees is not reviewable absent a clear violation of a specific command of the
Act by the Board), cert. denied sub nom. Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Murphy, 450 U.S. 917 (1981); Chicago Truck Drivers v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 816, 819 (7th Cir.
1979) (stating that district court jurisdiction pursuant to Kyne is warranted only if the
Board acts contrary to a clear and specific statutory directive); McCulloch v. LibbeyOwens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that the Board's
action was not so plainly beyond the bounds of, or so clearly in defiance of, the Act as
to give the district court jurisdiction of the matter), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969);
Suprenant Mfg. Co. v. Alpert, 318 F.2d 396, 399 (1st Cir. 1963) (finding that the Board's
action did not go beyond a clear and mandatory statutory limitation as in Kyne); see
also Goldberg, District Court Review of NLRB Representation Proceedings,42 IND.
L.J. 455, 479-81 (1967) (discussing the extremely narrow construction lower federal
courts had placed on the scope of district court review under Kyne in early cases).
Without circuit court support, district courts at first seem to have read Kyne more
broadly. See id. at 481 & n.83. However, today the district courts also seem to have
accepted a narrow reading of Kyne. See supra note 55.
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v. Boire,57 the Supreme Court encouraged a restrictive interpretation of Kyne by declaring that the "exception is a narrow one," not
to be applied in every case where "it can be said that an erroneous
assessment of the particular facts before the Board has led it to a
conclusion which does not comport with the law. 5 8s The dispute
in Boire was over how the law should apply to uncontested basic
facts, so that the Court's distinction of Kyne suggests direct review
is only available for the rare case in which the issue is solely legal.
Although this line may not have been strictly held to in all cases
since Boire,59 lower courts have generally resisted any significant
expansion of the Kyne exception, even in equitably appealing
cases.
The District of Columbia Circuit's en banc decision in Physi6 0 is illustracians National House Staff Association v. Fanning
tive. The Fanning court refused to permit unions representing
"interns, residents and clinical fellows... participating in hospital-based training programs" to obtain district court review of a
Board decision to treat them primarily as students and not as "employees" within the Act's jurisdictional definition.6 ' The court
stressed that the Act's definition of employee contained no "clear
statutory mandate" to guide the Board and that the physicians'
union wanted review of the Board's application of the legal definition to the facts. 62 As Judge J. Skelly Wright explained in dissent,6 3 the hospital's physician staff union presented a strong
claim for review for at least two reasons. Because the challenged
decision of the Board concerned a limit on the Act's jurisdiction,
the decision not only denied interns and residents the benefits of a
particular certification of a representative, but also denied them
any legal protection in continuing their efforts to achieve collective organization and bargaining.6 4 Further, Judge Wright asserted that the "house staff, like the workers in Kyne and unlike
the employer in Boire, have no feasible recourse other than this
65

suit."

57. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
58. Id. at 481.
59. See, e.g., Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (5th
Cir. 1971) (stating that direct review would be appropriate where relief would otherwise be absent or inadequate); UAW v. NLRB, 317 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (D.D.C. 1970)
(overturning the Board's refusal to certify an election where the Board arbitrarily
concluded that the effects of the election would be unfair); Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253
F. Supp. 391, 394-95 (D.D.C. 1966) (finding that direct review is available where the
Board has plainly violated its statutory duty to certify the results of an admittedly
valid election) (criticized in Recent Developments - Labor Law: Direct JudicialReview ofNLRB Election Orders,66 COLUm. L. REV. 1546,1548-51 (1966)); see also Miami
Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Local 46 v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993, 997-98 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (holding that review is available where the Board fails to meet a mandatory
duty to certify the results of an election) (decided before Boire)) .
60. 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
61. Id. at 494.
62. Id. at 496.
63. Id. at 500.
64. Id. at 513.
65. Id. at 512.
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The A.F.L. holding thus means that the only way that employers or unions can secure judicial review of a particular certification decision, other than squeezing into court through the narrow
Kyne exception,66 is to engage in an activity that (1) constitutes an
unfair labor practice only if the certification decision was correct
and (2) is so burdensome on another party that it files an unfair
labor practice complaint with the Board, thus making review
available. Although presenting almost no barrier to employers
wishing to secure review of Board certification decisions, this technical state of affairs has effectively prevented unions from securing review in all but a few instances.
To obtain judicial consideration of a Board certification decision,
an employer simply refuses to bargain with a certified union. Because this refusal constitutes an unfair labor practice only if the
Board certification decision was correct, 67 the employer can easily
meet the first condition for securing review of the certification decision through section 10(f). The second condition is also met in
almost all cases in which a union finds it necessary to invoke the
Board's certification process in order to secure representational
status. Such a union can rarely force an employer to bargain without obtaining the Board's protection of its certified status by filing
an unfair labor practice complaint against the employer.
The union's dependence on the Board seems inevitable because
after the representation election, while the Board considers the
employer's objections to the union's certification, the depth and
breadth of the union's support usually erodes, and is rarely enhanced. During an organizational campaign, union supporters ex68
pose themselves to the risk and reality of employer retaliation,
and it is a normal human reaction to doubt whether the risks of an
activity are justified as its tangible benefits are delayed. In many
instances, therefore, it is unrealistic for union organizers to expect
employees to enforce the results of their representation election
by a costly recognitional strike. Furthermore, most unions that
remain sufficiently strong to call a recognitional strike after an
66. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10, 16-17 (1963); Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949); infra notes 198-202 and
accompanying text.
67. As noted, an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to
bargain with an uncertified or invalidly certified union, even if that union in fact has
majority support. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301,
309-310 (1974).
68. Professor Weiler recently demonstrated just how real this risk is. Based on an
analysis of Board statistics, he estimates that one out of every 20 union voters in representation elections in 1980 were discharged because of their union involvement. See
Weiler, supra note 6, at 1781; see also R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 6, at 23233 (making the same estimate and noting "there is roughly one case of illegal discharge deemed meritorious by the NLRB for every NLRB representation election").
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employer's postcertification refusal to bargain support the strike
by filing an unfair labor practice charge against the employer.
The charge supports the strike because strikers protesting unfair
labor practices, unlike economic strikers, cannot be permanently
replaced by their employers. 69 Thus, when employers resist bargaining after union certification, prudent union leaders hoping to
obtain a first contract usually file unfair labor practice charges
70
against the employer.
71
Furthermore, the Act, at least as now written and interpreted,
authorizes no remedies to discourage employers from using the
section 9(d) and section 10(f) appeal process to simultaneously obtain review of Board certification decisions and delay bargaining.
Given the high cost that first contracts may impose on employers,

such remedies would have to include serious threats. 72 In fact, the
major Board remedy

-

a simple order to the employer to do what

it should have been doing all along, bargain in good faith -

is no

threat at all. 73 The original drafters of the Wagner Act may have
assumed that appeals from Board certification decisions would be
inhibited because most employers would not want to risk incurring the stigma of engaging in illegal conduct by refusing to bargain with a certified union.7 4 Even if such an assumption once had
some validity, however, any such taint has completely faded75 as
69. Compare NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (stating that an economic striker may be replaced permanently) with Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956) (stating that reinstatement must be made
available to unfair labor practice strikers) and NLRB v. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 353 F.2d
157, 161 (6th Cir. 1965) (same).
70. There are no doubt exceptions. A union that has sufficient economic leverage
to shut down an employer's operations over a recognitional dispute may be forced into
a certification election by the employer's petition for such an election, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1)(B) (1982), or by an employer's complaint against the union's extended
recognitional picketing, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982). Such a union, after winning a certification election, may continue to be confident that it has adequate leverage, without the assistance of the Board, to force the employer to bargain, and if
necessary, to reinstate any strikers. Nevertheless, such a union usually would want to
file a refusal-to-bargain charge, because it would not fear judicial review of a certification decision that it did not need, and that it could probably obtain again. See
Goldberg, supra note 56, at 493 n.122.
71. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; infra note 126 and accompanying
text.
72. Empirical studies continue to indicate that collective bargaining agreements
can have a substantial impact on profits. See R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 6,
at 181-90.
73. The Board has recognized this itself, even as it has resisted claiming the authority to impose more deterrent remedies. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107,
108 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. There seems to be nothing in the legislative history of the Wagner Act to suggest that Congress considered the likelihood of employers refusing to bargain in order
to obtain review, but some courts have expressed concern about placing the "stigma"
of illegality on employers seeking review. See, e.g., Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp.
391, 395 (D.D.C. 1966).
75. Such an unfair labor practice is now referred to as a "technical refusal to bargain" or a "technical 8(a)(5)" by commentators, see, e.g., R. WILLIAMS, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 20-21 (Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8,
1985), and by the courts and Board, see, e.g., Raley's, Inc. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1204, 120607 (9th Cir. 1984) (Pregerson, J., concurring); Sub-Zero Freezer Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 47,
47 (1984).
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76
practice under the Act has become routinized.
Unions, in contrast, seldom have been able to utilize the section
10(f) method of circuit court review to obtain judicial reconsideration of Board certification decisions to which they objected. 77 A
union appeal through section 10(f) is only possible when the Board
holds a certification election that it determines to be both valid
and unsuccessful for the union. Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act prohibits a union from picketing or threatening to picket an employer
to force recognition of the union as a collective bargaining representative, "where within the preceding twelve months a valid elec78
tion under section [9(c) of the Act] has been conducted.1
Recognitional picketing within a year after a representational
election that the union has lost is thus an unfair labor practice
only if the election was "valid," and a union should be able to test
that validity in a circuit court.
In fact, however, there are almost no reported cases in which
unions have obtained judicial review of the Board's certification
decisions by engaging in recognitional picketing. 79 One reason
may be that the second condition listed above for securing review
of certification decisions through section 10(f) is infrequently fulfilled by union recognitional picketing: unions are unable to make
such picketing sufficiently burdensome on employers to induce
them to file section 8(b)(7)(B) unfair labor practice charges.8 0
Such picketing usually is burdensome on employers only if used to
76. After a victory in a certification election, unions are sometimes able to move
hesitant employers to the bargaining table. But their doing so cannot depend simply
on Board and judicial government processes. Even certified unions are dependent
upon their own economic power, their ability to engage in or at least meaningfully
threaten a work stoppage. Indeed, the law's greatest assistance to a certified union is
the protection from permanent replacement afforded strikers protesting an employer's illegal refusal to bargain. See supra note 69. Only employers who cannot
withstand a protected unfair labor practice, recognitional strike have strong incentives to bargain with a certified union before exhausting their opportunities for
review.
77. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text; infra note 82.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1982).
79. Section 8(b)(7)(B) is regularly described as the union's route to judicial review
of Board section 9 decisions, without any citation of cases in which a union took the
route. See Cannery Warehousemen v. Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77, 80-81 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1980); United Fed'n of College Teachers v. Miller, 479 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (2d Cir.
1973). Research yields only two cases in which a union was able to use recognitional
picketing to obtain review of a section 9 decision. The most recent involved a union
that had already given employees tangible benefits in prior bargaining because the
election to which the union objected was for its decertification, rather than its original
certification. See NLRB v. Lawrence Typographical Union, 376 F.2d 643, 649-52 (10th
Cir. 1967); see also NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir.
1963) (upholding Board order for union to cease postelection recognitional picketing
because such picketing violated section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act).
80. See NLRB v. Interstate Press Carriers, Inc., 610 F.2d 99, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1979).
The Third Circuit noted that "[t]he General Counsel may decline to act even if a
charge is filed." Id.
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induce a strike, and a recognitional strike after the Board announces a union election defeat is even more difficult to organize
than a strike after the Board announces a union victory. This is
true because union organizers have less promising tangible
prospects with which to boost employee morale after a defeat.
Furthermore, the strikers, who would not be classed unfair labor
practice strikers, would be vulnerable to permanent replacement
by aggressive employers.8 1 In addition, those employees who
picket, even if they are not also striking, are vulnerable to selective and outright discharge because activity that is an unfair labor
practice is not considered concerted activity protected from employer retaliation.82 Finally, a union can gain little from judicial
review of a Board declaration that the union's election defeat was
valid. Such review would not reverse the Board's decision within
a year of the election and, after a year, a union can obtain a new
election by petitioning to the Board without reversal of the
83
Board's first election.
The prospects for obtaining meaningful judicial review are even
worse for a union that objects to a Board certification decision that
does not lead to an election. Board decisions of this sort are not
uncommon; they include Board rejections of the appropriateness
of bargaining units suggested by unions and Board rejections of
jurisdiction over the employees that the union seeks to represent.
The hospital unions in Fanning,4 for example, could commit no
unfair labor practice based on the Board's finding that hospital interns and residents are not employees within the meaning of the
Act.8 5 In contrast, if the Board found jurisdiction over residents
and interns at a particular hospital and a union won the ensuing
election, the employer could obtain section 10(f) review of both
the Board's decision to assert jurisdiction and its judgment on the
appropriateness of the unit simply by refusing to bargain with the
ostensibly "victorious" union.
The employer-union imbalance is also reflected in a union's inability to obtain section 10(f) review of another important set of
Board certification decisions: those to overturn a union election
victory because of a Board finding of an impropriety that may
have prevented true employee sentiments from being registered.
A union contesting such a Board determination in court might en81. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
82. See Interstate Press Carriers,610 F.2d at 109.
83. See FEERICK & BAER, supra note 19, at 261. Section 9(c)(3) provides that no
election shall be held within a year of a prior valid election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)
(1982).
84. 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
85. As long as the Board determines that residents and interns are not employees
under the Act, recognitional picketing by the interns' and residents' unions would not
be a section 8(b)(7) violation; this section applies only when an employer is asked to
recognize a union as the representative of his "employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)
(1982). Similarly, a union that unsuccessfully sought a particular bargaining unit
might, pursuant to the provisions of section 8(b)(7)(C), provoke an expedited election,
but it could not provoke review of the Board's decision to find the union's preferred
unit inappropriate.
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gage in recognitional picketing and then claim that the picketing
would not constitute a section 8(b)(7)(C) violation had the Board
certified the results. Section 8(b)(7)(C) proscribes recognitional
picketing without filing a representational petition unless the
picketing union "is currently certified" as the representative of
the employees for whom it is picketing.8 6 But a reading of "is currently certified" to include "or should have been so certified"
seems unnecessarily broad in light of the primary purpose of section 8(b)(7), which is to discourage disruptive picketing in favor of
87
peaceful Board processes for settling representational disputes.
In any event, there seems to be no judicial decision that, through
consideration of a section 8(b)(7)(C) unfair labor practice finding,
reviewed a Board refusal to certify a union election victory.88 In
contrast, by refusing to bargain after a second election that results
in the union's certification, employers have been able to obtain review of Board decisions finding a union's defeat in a prior election
tainted.89
C. Righting the Imbalance Through Direct JudicialReview
To a significant extent, the imbalance of review opportunities
can be explained by the formal meaning and practical application
of some technical provisions in the Act and their interpretation by
the courts. The elimination of judicial review, however, does not
seem to be the only way to right the imbalance caused by these
provisions. At least for those influenced by the presumption of
judicial review, the most obvious way to correct the imbalance
would be to provide employers, unions, and employees direct judicial review after the Board has considered any objections filed by
these parties at the completion of the certification process. The
failure of reformers to press for even this alternative in the last
two decades can be explained and criticized through a quick review of the National Labor Relations Act's history.
The first set of Labor Act reformers did try to enact expanded
direct review of Board certification decisions. Before the Taft86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982).
87. Cf. NLRB v. Interstate Press Carriers, Inc., 610 F.2d 99, 109 (3d Cir. 1979)
(noting Congress's purpose in enacting section 8(b)(7) as limiting recognitional picketing and avoiding its disruptive impact).
88. By engaging in recognitional picketing, a union also might seek review of the
Board's refusal to certify the results of an initial election if it loses a rerun election
called by the Board and the employer files a § 8(b)(7)(B) charge against the union.
Whether the validity of the first election could undercut the validity of the second is
also an issue that apparently has never been decided.
89. See, e.g., Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir.
1978); Hecla Mining Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Kilgore
Corp., 510 F.2d 1165, 1166 (6th Cir. 1975); Boaz Spinning v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 876, 878
(6th Cir. 1968).
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Hartley amendments to the Labor Act 90 there were, of course, no
union unfair labor practices and therefore not even a theoretical
possibility of section 10(f) review of union objections to Board certification decisions. 91 During the twelve years preceding TaftHartley, unsuccessful legislative efforts were made to grant unions aggrieved by the certification of rival unions, or even by the
92
direction of an election, a right of direct appeal in a circuit court.
Then, during the Taft-Hartley legislative process, the House
passed a proposal, which the Senate rejected, that granted direct
postelection review in the circuit courts to any person aggrieved
by a Board certification.9 3
None of these legislative proposals presents an adequate model
for contemporary reformers interested in equalizing union and
employer opportunities for judicial review of Board certification
decisions because none would have provided review of decisions to
not certify or to not proceed with a representational election. The
primary arguments made against their passage, however, were not
related to the above deficiencies. Instead, critics expressed concern that expanding and accelerating private rights to appeal
Board certification decisions would frequently lead to delays in
94
the commencement of collective bargaining.
Those opposed to the early proposals expanding judicial review
of Board certification decisions could cite the legislative history of
the Wagner Act, which evidenced congressional intent that the judicial review experience under the earlier Public Resolution 4495
not be repeated. This resolution, which created the first National
Labor Relations Board to administer the National Industrial Recovery Act, afforded direct review in the circuit courts of any
Board decision to conduct a representation election.96 Congress
concluded that employers had utilized this opportunity for preelection review to delay elections for over a year while the courts
90. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982)).
91. Section 8(b)(7) was not added until the enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act
in 1959. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)
(1982)).
92. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 463 & n.20 (citing S. 1264, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1939); S. 1000, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939)). Only S. 1264 provided for review of orders
directing an election.
93. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(f) (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 158, 199-200,
350-51 (1948); 93 CONG. REc. 6444 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at

1542 (1948).

94. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. S6602 (daily ed. June 5, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft),
reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

ACT, 1947, at 1542 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1947) (minority
report), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 385 (1948); see also Goldberg, supra note 56, at 463-65
(discussing criticism of dilatory tactics in the context of the advantages and disadvantages of allowing appeals of certification orders).
95. Public Resolution 44, H.R.J. Res. 375, 73d Cong, 2d Sess., 48 Stat. 1183 (1934),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 648 (1966).
96. Id. § 2.
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considered their objections.9 7 The indirect postelection and certification review method embodied in sections 9(d) and 10(f) was
the response of the Wagner Congress. The opponents of the early
proposals to amend this method could argue that allowing rival
unions as well as employers to contest Board certifications in
court could delay collective bargaining in additional cases. Further, allowing review of Board certification decisions only, but not
of Board rejections of certification, would offer little judicial protection of the right to choose certification to compensate for the
delays of review.
More importantly, however, the Wagner Act's response to the
problem of delay was glaringly inadequate. Although the system
of section 9(d) and 10(f) review was a clear improvement over the
preelection review afforded under Public Resolution 44, it also is
clearly inferior to simple postelection review that is not dependent
on an unfair labor practice charge. This is true not only because
the latter system of direct review could afford equal access to reviewing courts to those who are effectively, if not formally, denied
such access at present. It is also true because the judicial review
system constructed by a Congress appreciative of how the delay of
review can inhibit the development of collective bargaining ironically aggravates the delay by adding an additional step: the employer must refuse to bargain and the Board must find this to be
an unfair labor practice before the employer can proceed with its
appeal. Permitting employers to appeal Board certifications directly after they are rendered, and requiring such appeals to be
brought within, say, 30 days, 98 would probably save about six
months of delay in the average circuit court certification review. 99
97. Both the Senate and the House Reports on the Wagner Act stressed this criticism of the implementation of Public Resolution 44. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-6 (1935), reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 2300, 2305 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1935), reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 2956, 2960-61 (1949); see also Goldberg, supranote 56, at 46061 (noting that dilatory tactics were creating the very unrest that Public Resolution 44
was designed to prevent).
98. The unsuccessful Labor Reform Act of 1977 would have required any party
who wished to preserve the right to obtain judicial review of a Board decision to initiate an appeal within 30 days of the contested decision. See H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(a) (1977). Although the Act currently contains no fixed limitation on the
period during which a party can appeal a final order of the Board, the Board itself has
authority to initiate actions to enforce its orders against recalcitrant parties. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). If Board certifications were made enforceable orders, this authority could be utilized to speed judicial review of employer objections.
99. Most section 8(a)(5) charges against employers who object to a certification
decision are affirmed by the Board on motions for summary judgment without a hearing before an administrative law judge. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 101.12 (1986) (discussing Board review of administrative law judges' decisions and the issuance of
orders). Most such charges thus are processed more quickly than the more than 600-
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The Congress that adopted the Wagner Act, focusing on an experience with preelection review under Public Resolution 44,
seemed concerned only about the attrition of union strength
before the level of that strength could be registered in a representational election. A half-century of experience with the Wagner
Act, however, has taught contemporary analysts what logic might
have predicted: postelection delay in the commencement of meaningful, good-faith bargaining can as effectively erode employee
support for a union and the development of a mature collective
bargaining relationship as can preelection delay. 0 0 A union gains
nothing from winning a representational election as long as the
employer continues to resist bargaining. As time passes while the
employer uses, first, the Board's internal review processes and,
then, the court's external processes, union promises of the benefits of collective bargaining become less and less tangible to even
those employees who cast prounion votes.
Today Justice Brennan's dissent in Leedom v. Kyne,'10 arguing
against permitting any erosion of the exclusivity of the Wagner
Act's section 9(d) and 10(f) certification review system, seems extremely naive. If "courts should not interfere with the prompt
holding of representation elections or the commencement of collective bargaining once an employee representative has been chosen" and if "time-consuming review might defeat the objectives of
the national labor policy,"'10 2 then section 9(d) and 10(f) review is
even less desirable than the postelection, direct review sought by
the plaintiffs in Kyne.
D.

Achieving Balance and EliminatingDelay Through the
Restriction of Judicial Review

It is thus clear that the present indirect system of review of
abrogated. 10 3
be
should
decisions
certification
Board
day period now required for the processing of the average unfair labor practice
charge. See 47 NLRB ANN. REP. 317 app. (1982) (most recent published statistics).
Nevertheless, a study conducted for former Board Member John A. Penello by the
Board's Data Systems Branch indicated that the Board's processing of the 8(a)(5)
charge adds 7.5 months to the review process. Conversation with Joseph E. Moore,
Associate Executive Secretary, NLRB (March 7, 1986); see General Knit of California,
Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 627 (1978) (Penello, Member, dissenting). This calculation is
roughly consistent with anecdotal reports of delay. See NLRB v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703,
704 (7th Cir. 1983) (providing an example of a 5-month delay); H.R. REP. No. 342-6,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976) (example of 9-month delay); HearingBefore the House
of Representatives Subcommittee on Manpower and Housing of the Committee on
Government Operations,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (Nov. 2, 1983).
100. See, e.g., W. COOKE, UNION ORGANIZING AND PUBLIC POLICY: FAILURE TO SECURE FIRST CONTRACTS 90, 97 (1985); Weiler, supra note 8, at 354-57 (observing that in
1955 unions won certifications covering 73% of all employees involved in election campaigns, and by 1980 this measure of union success had fallen to 37%).
101. 358 U.S. 184, 191-201 (1958).
102. Id. at 191-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. One might argue that in many cases the threat of judicial contempt sanctions
enables the present system of review to initiate meaningful collective bargaining
more quickly than could a direct system of review. Under the present system, an
employer risks contempt by engaging in surface bargaining after it is subject to a judicially enforced bargaining order issued upon review of the employer's election objec[VOL.
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Contemporary collective bargaining advocates, however, should
not be satisfied with the replacement of the Wagner Act scheme
by a system of direct postelection (or even post-termination of the
certification process) 0 4 review made available to any party aggrieved by a Board certification decision. Addressing the reality of
the imbalance between employer and union opportunities for judicial review of certification decisions is complicated significantly by
the inevitability of the second reality: the delays coincident with
judicial review almost always make it less likely that a collective
bargaining relationship will be established, regardless of whether
the reviewing court upholds the Board's decision. As a result, a
system of judicial review that formally promises equal access to
reviewing courts to both unions and employers dissatisfied with
Board certification decisions can never be equal in fact. The sophisticated employer wishing to avoid collective bargaining knows
that, even if unsuccessful in securing reversal of the Board certification decision upon which its bargaining obligation depends, contesting its obligation in lengthy litigation will be to its advantage.
The employer knows that the longer the delay between the commencement of union organizing and the commencement of meaningful collective bargaining, the more difficulty the union will
have maintaining the employee allegiance and solidarity necessary
to secure an initial collective agreement.
Empirical studies indicate that delays in litigation make the establishment of a collective bargaining relationship less and less
likely. 10 5 In testimony before a congressional subcommittee
tions. Surface bargaining, however, can also be discouraged through the issuance of a
bargaining order by a court that rejected an employer's election objections in a new
system of direct review. See infra note 131 and accompanying text (arguing that a
make-whole remedy would supplement modification of the certification review system).
The present review system also has the advantage of ensuring that, as unfair labor
practice strikers, employees will enjoy protection from being permanently replaced if
they engage in a recognitional strike after Board certification of their union. But direct judicial review of certification decisions would not necessarily eliminate that protection. There is no reason why the Board could not offer protection to employees
who protest their employer's refusal to honor a Board certification decision while the
employer appealed that decision to a reviewing court.
104. To balance the opportunity for direct review, unions would have to be given
the opportunity to seek review of any Board decision terminating the certification
process before certification is actually granted.
105. See, e.g., W. COOKE, supra note 100, at 90, 97. Professor William N. Cooke
analyzed 118 certifications from the Board's Indiana region to determine the relationship of several variables, including delay, to the likelihood of a certified union's ability
to obtain a first contract. Id. at 74, 76-77. He concluded that "every one month delay
between election date and NLRB close date of objections and challenges to election
outcomes reduces the probability of obtaining an agreement by as much as 4 percentage points." Id. at 90. Another recent study demonstrated that union support generally declines with the passage of time from the original organization drive by showing
that the probability of a union victory in a representational election declines by sev-
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studying the failure of the Act to advance collective bargaining,
union organizers and leaders repeatedly asserted that delay
caused by litigation over Board certification decisions erodes the
employee support built during organizational campaigns. 10 6 This
occurs both through employee turnover and through loss of belief
in the promise of the law. Courts have taken judicial notice of the
likelihood that employee sentiments regarding unions will change
10 7
over the course of multiple year litigation.
In contrast, judicial review can offer unions little. For example,
unions can gain little from successful appeals of most Board decisions against proceeding to certification. Most appeals take over a
year in the courts, 0 s and a successful appeal only recommences a
process that could recommence anyway after a year without litigation.1 0 9 Judicial reversal of a Board refusal to invalidate an election that the union lost does not certify the union; it only results
in a new election. 1 0 Underlying employee support for the union,
discouraged by the employer's inappropriate election conduct,
may not surface revitalized in a judicially ordered second election
held two years later. Instead, the delay probably will compound
the employer's discouragement of the union's support. At the
eral percentage points with each week of delay. Chiaravalli & Lardaro, The Impact of
RepresentationCase Hearingson CertificationElection Outcomes, 7 INDUs. REL. L.J.
232, 240 (1985). An earlier study found that the longer a union must litigate to commence serious bargaining, the less chance it has to achieve a contract. Analysis of
Administrative Process under Taft-Hartley, 1966 LAB. REL. Y.B. 299, 302; see also
Wolkinson, The Remedial Efficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk Cases, 55 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 11-14 & n.30 (1969) (studying 61 Joy Silk cases arising between July 1966
and December 1967 and concluding that the longer the period of litigation before the
enforcement order, the less likely the obtaining of a first contract).
106. National Labor Relations Board Case Backlog: HearingsBefore a Subcomm.
of the House Comm on Government Operations,98th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-41, 65, 68-73
(1983) [hereinafter NLRB Backlog Hearings].
107. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 426
F.2d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir.) (Tiidee 1) (observing that "[e]mployee interest in a union
can wane quickly as working conditions remain apparently unaffected by the union or
collective bargaining"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). Courts have sometimes done
so as a basis for not remanding Board certification decisions in favor of simple denials
of the enforcement of bargaining orders against employers. See Mosey Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 701 F.2d 610, 611-15 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (refusing to enforce a bargaining
order against an employer where the delay was caused by the Board's repeated flipflop on whether union misrepresentations are grounds for setting aside an election).
108. The median time between a final Board decision and a court of appeals opinion reviewing such a decision is now 450 days. Letter from Joseph E. Moore, Associate Executive Secretary, NLRB (Apr. 29, 1986) (copy on file at the George
Washington Law Review).
109. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. This is at least one reason why
unions rarely have attempted to seek indirect section 9(d) review of election defeats.
110. A union that had a preelection authorization card majority may obtain a bargaining order after an election defeat, but only as a remedy for serious employer unfair labor practices that would prevent a fair second election from being held. See
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-15 (1969). A union without a card majority cannot obtain such relief, however, see Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355,
1383-84 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270
N.L.R.B. 578, 583 (1984), and elections can be invalid in the absence of serious, or even
any, unfair labor practices, see General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948). In
any event, restricting judicial review of Board certification decisions would not impede review of Board decisions and orders concerning election-involved unfair labor
practices.
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least, the union will have to undertake further significant organizational efforts; and such efforts could secure a new election one
year after an election loss without a court order.
Judicial reversal of a Board decision to reject a union election
victory presumably could result in immediate certification.,-" But
even this possibility does not compensate for the delay of review.
A union that spends over a year appealing a Board decision may
lose the employee support necessary to secure a collective bargaining relationship. A court-enforced Board order to an employer to
bargain in good faith does not necessarily yield a collective agreement. 12 An employer's obligation to bargain in good faith is not
an obligation to accept an agreement that will convince employees
that the long struggle to organize was worthwhile. 1 3 A union
must convince an employer to enter into such an agreement, and it
is unlikely that it can do so without the continuing strong allegiance of unit employees willing to take the risk of a concerted
work action. Certification by a governmental authority may help
maintain adequate employee solidarity in some cases," 4 but as
time passes Board certification surely becomes less and less
helpful.
111. Courts have not yet forced the Board to certify unions in such circumstances,
which probably reflects the present inability of unions to obtain review of Board rejections of their election victories. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
112. Professor Cooke's study of 118 union certification victories in the Board's Indiana region and of 140 other union certifications from a nationwide sample indicated
that unions fail to obtain first contracts in about one out of four certifications. See W.
COOKE, supra note 100, at 60, 74, 76. A study by the AFL-CIO's National Organizing
Committee found that from April 1979 to March 1981 unions gained first contracts in
only 63% of their election victories in units of over 100 employees. See Memorandum
from Charles McDonald, Executive Assistant to the Director, Department of Organization and Field Services, AFL-CIO to AFL-CIO National Organizing Committee
(Feb. 18, 1983) [hereinafter McDonald Memorandum] (copy on file at the George
Washington Law Review). Studies of earlier years indicate a higher success rate for
unions. See Weiler, supra note 8, at 353-55 & n.7.
113. Employers must demonstrate a sincere desire to reach an agreement with a
certified bargaining representative, but courts have generally resisted Board efforts to
require employers to reach an agreement granting a level of benefits to employees
that makes collective bargaining attractive. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1978); Wal-Lite Div. of U.S. Gypsum Co. v.
NLRB, 484 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1973); Chevron Oil Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1067, 1073
(5th Cir. 1971); see also NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952)
(stating that the Act does not "regulate the substantive terms governing wages, hours
and working conditions which are incorporated in an agreement"). The Act expressly
provides that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
But see Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding Board
finding of an employer's bad faith because it insisted on a contract that would "place
the employees in a worse position than if they had no contract at all").
114. A study of union election victories in units of over 100 employees found that
first contracts were obtained in 30% of those cases in which an employer forced a
victorious union to obtain a bargaining order from the Board. See McDonald Memorandum, supra note 112.
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Litigation delay can be viewed as a problem of administrative
process rather than of judicial review. Only a small proportion of
employer certification disputes with the Board reaches the
courts, 15 and as much time can be expended in litigation over certification disputes at the Board as in the courts. 116 Moreover, empirical research suggests that even if the Board could enforce a
certification decision without first processing a perfunctory unfair
labor practice charge, the remaining administrative delay could
1 7
prevent unions from obtaining first contracts in many cases.
All of this, however, indicates only that proposals to restrict judicial review should not be separated from a general labor law
package that includes ways to mitigate both administrative and judicial delays. Restricting judicial review must be one element of
that package for several reasons. Delays associated with judicial
review, when added to administrative delay, make the obtaining of
a first contract even less likely.1 18 Even the threat of the delay
associated with an appeal through the courts may be crippling to a
union already exhausted by administrative litigation. Union organizers, who recognize that the employer could delay bargaining
for more than another year through a judicial appeal, may abandon efforts to obtain a contract before such an appeal is even utilized. 11-9 Furthermore, minimizing administrative delay could be
for naught if the delays associated with judicial review are not
eliminated as well. Otherwise, accelerating administrative consideration of employer objections to Board certification processes
might only lead to greater utilization of judicial processes to exhaust unions whenever their support is vulnerable to the passage
of time.
Some administrative delay seems to be caused directly by judicial demands on the administrative process that could be eliminated by a sharp restriction of judicial review. For example,
115. The Board's most recent annual report indicates that employers filed objections in 249 representation cases closed in fiscal year 1982. 47 NLRB ANN. REP. 288,
table 11C (1982). Five years earlier this figure was 537. 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 291, table
11C (1977). In contrast, only a few dozen certification disputes reach the courts each
year. See supra note 35.
116. Administrative, rather than judicial, delay has been the focus of recent congressional scrutiny, and union leaders have complained as much about administrative
as judicial delays. See, e.g., NLRB Backlog Hearings,supra note 106, at 1-2 (discussing
the backlog of cases, decreasing number of decisions, and delay of cases before the
Board); H.R. REP. No. 1141, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1984) (concluding that the Board
is in a crisis because of a case backlog and the turnover in Board membership).
117. A major recent empirical study correlating litigation delay with a reduced
likelihood of unions' obtaining first contracts focused only on the administrative period between the election day and the date when the Board closed the certification
process. See W. COOKE, supra note 100, at 79. When the regional director decides that
a hearing must be held, the median time for full processing of petitions in representation cases is about 11 months. See 47 NLRB ANN. REP. 317, table 23 (1982).
118. Cf. Wolkinson, supra note 105, at 11 & n.30 (a 1960s study of Joy Silk case
indicating that a union is less likely to obtain a first contract as litigation increases and
after a period of administrative delay in enforcing a bargaining order).
119. Cf. Weiler, supra note 6, at 1797 (arguing that the "prospect of long delay in
prosecuting a formal [unfair labor practice] charge" increases the likelihood that an
employer can achieve an advantageous settlement without litigation).
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although the statute does not demand it, the Board traditionally
has held formal, evidentiary hearings on objections to the validity
of representational elections in limited circumstances. In general,
the Board holds postelection hearings only when nonhearsay evidence indicates that activity that would taint the election, under
the Board's substantive standards, actually transpired.120 The
Board, for example, has not held hearings on the probable effects
of some challenged activity, relying instead on its own expertise to
apply an objective test of whether the activity was "likely to coerce prospective voters."' 2 1 After some investigation, the Board
has dismissed other objections without a formal hearing. In the
last decade, however, some circuit courts have demanded that the
Board hold hearings on the basis of hearsay evidence and on the
probable effects of particular campaign activity. 2

2

The result, of

course, is not only further delay in those cases remanded to the
Board, but also a deflection of scarce Board resources and a consequent inevitable delay in other cases. Indeed, the very need to defend Board certification decisions in court is itself a substantial
burden on the Board's resources that could otherwise be used to
administratively
process Board certification disputes more
3
quickly.2

In sum, to avoid delay of collective bargaining for any substantial period after holding representation elections, labor law reform
must address the delays associated with judicial review as well as
those associated with Board review. It should also be clear that
sharply restricting judicial review is the most effective way to re4
duce the delays associated with such review.2
120. See Farber, supranote 34, at 257-60, 269.
121. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 942, 942 (1969).
122. See, e.g., ARA Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 936, 937 (3d Cir. 1983) (requiring
Board to hold a hearing on effects on employees of union threats during election);
EDS - IDAB, Inc. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring Board to hold
a hearing on the basis of hearsay affidavits). For further discussion see Farber, supra
note 34, at 261-70, and additional cases cited therein.
123. One study of administrative delay at the Board indicates that the diversion of
staff resources does exacerbate delay. See Roomkin & Block, Case Processing Time
and the Outcome ofRepresentationElections: Some EmpiricalEvidence, 1981 U. ILL.
L. REV. 75, 82.
124. Judicial review of election or campaign-related unfair labor practice findings
need not be restricted, but such review should not be used to reconsider Board certification decisions. Cf. Graham Architectural Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534, 543 &
n.12 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the court has no jurisdiction to review representational questions concurrent with review of election-related unfair labor practice
charges); Custom Recovery, Div. of Keystone Resources, Inc. v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 1041,
1046 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 156 (6th Cir.
1969) (same). Therefore, if an employer appeals a Board finding that a union did not
commit an unfair labor practice during a successful election campaign, judicial reversal of the Board's unfair labor practice decision should not relieve the employer from
its duty to bargain.
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Labor law reformers have advanced an alternative method to
lessen delays in the commencement of collective bargaining after
Board certifications in the past two decades. As noted above, collective bargaining advocates have proposed giving the Board
authority to order employers to compensate bargaining-unit employees for the estimated wages and other benefits that they could
have enjoyed had the employer fulfilled its obligation to bargain
in good faith. 125 Board use of such authority would presumably
discourage employer appeals of Board certifications because it
would eliminate one of the incentives for such appeals - delaying
the cost of the agreement that could result from sincere
126
bargaining.
Ordering this "make-whole" remedy, however, would not eliminate two additional incentives for employers to appeal Board certification decisions. First, employers can still hope that years of
litigation will sufficiently erode union solidarity so that unions
will be unable to withstand even good-faith bargaining. A makewhole remedy would often help union organizers rekindle organizational morale that has dissipated during protracted litigation,
but it cannot always assure the return of that morale or compensate for the inevitable turnover of employees. A make-whole remedy - which does no more than force an employer to pay the
same benefits it would have paid if it had bargained when the
union's strength was flush with a recent election victory - may
not discourage an employer from trying to interrupt the union's
nascent momentum. 27
The second incentive to appeal that employers have in the face
of the threat of a make-whole remedy is simply the possibility of
winning the appeal. At first blush, this incentive may seem fully
appropriate, for the purpose of judicial review is presumably the
righting of administrative wrongs. However, if we question the
assumption that the judgments of courts on decisions like those
involved in certifications are more likely to be correct than those
of the Board, 128 even judicial review sought by reason of this incentive may not be desirable. The first reality of judicial review of
Board certification decisions - the imbalance of real opportunities for review - should be recalled here. Even with the incentive
of a seemingly winning case to attract a union to the courts, get1 29
ting there may be practically, if not technically, impossible.
125. See supra note 11.
126. See supra note 12.
127. This seems true even though the Board is willing to order reimbursement of
its and the union's litigation expenses, as well as the union's organizational expenses,
when an employer's defenses to a refusal-to-bargain charge are "'patently frivolous.'
See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 8 (1974)
(quoting Tiidee Prods., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1236 (1972), enforced as modified sub nom.
International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (Tiidee I!), cert denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975)).
128. See infra note 267 and accompanying text (discussing a deep commitment to
the judiciary).
129. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, addressing this imbalance by amending the Act to
provide direct review will not change the fact that a union victory
in a certification dispute after several years of litigation is almost
always eroded by the passage of time, whereas an employer victory is almost always enhanced.
The prospect of a make-whole remedy for employer refusals to
bargain, therefore, should not deflect the attention of labor law
reformers from the inevitable problems caused by the availability
of judicial review of Board certification decisions. 130 Indeed,
sharply restricting such review and authorizing a make-whole
remedy would probably operate more effectively in tandem than
either could separately. On one hand, curtailing judicial review of
Board certification decisions would eliminate some justification
for employers' refusals to bargain and thus reduce the number of
cases in which the Board would be burdened by determining the
appropriateness of the make-whole remedy. On the other hand,
the availability of the make-whole remedy would deter employers
who, denied the option of delaying bargaining by contesting Board
certification decisions in the courts, would otherwise be tempted
to achieve delay by bad-faith machinations at the bargaining
table. 3 1
Consideration of the make-whole remedy and consideration of
the problem of administrative delay thus yield the same conclusion: Restricting judicial review of Board certification decisions
seems to fit as one element in an overall package of labor law
reform. 132
130. If judicial review of certification decisions had historically been restricted, and
section 10(f) review never available, the make-whole remedy might be more acceptable today. One argument made against the make-whole remedy has been that its
adoption would penalize employers for exercising their right to obtain judicial review
of Board certifications. See, e.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 (1970); Labor
Law Reform Ac Part2: Hearingson H.R. 8410 before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Educationand Labor,95th Cong., 1st Sess.
547 (1977) (statement of Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.); St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039, 1042 n.18 (1968). Such an
argument could carry no weight were section 10(f) review not available.
131. The present indirect system of review of Board certification decisions does not
discourage such bad-faith machinations. By engaging in surface bargaining, employers can now extend the delay of good-faith bargaining even after an unsuccessful judicial appeal of a Board certification decision. This unsuccessful appeal will probably
place an employer under a judicially enforced bargaining order, but the courts are
unlikely to penalize, as serious contempt of an order imposed because of a certification appeal, the employer's surface bargaining. Research located no decisions imposing contempt penalties in such circumstances. Whether judicial review is restricted,
made direct, or kept indirect, more certain disincentives to employer surface bargaining are required than the threat of contempt.
132. Similarly, restricting judicial review of Labor Board certification decisions
would supplement and be supplemented by, rather than supplant or be supplanted by,
other important recent labor law reform proposals. Professor Weiler, for instance,
proposes that representational elections be held within a few days of the filing of a
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I

Restricting the Reviewability of Board Certification
Decisions Without CompromisingInterests
Protected by the Labor Act

The presumption in favor of judicial review may influence many
to resist a sharp restriction of judicial review of Board certification
decisions for two kinds of reasons. First, some may assume that
such a restriction would impair the protection of individual rights
important to the Labor Act. Second, many may believe that restricting review would upset an appropriate constitutional balance
of power.
This section deflates the first assumption by developing a specific proposal for restricting review that is fully consistent with
the goals of the Labor Act. This proposal would permit courts to
review Board certification decisions for only a small and bounded
set of considerations, the most important of which are: nonfrivolous constitutional issues, the jurisdictional limits on Board authority, and the good-faith motivation of Board members. The
following section explains why there is nothing in the Constitution that prevents the implementation of such a proposal.
The first step toward development of an appropriate balance of
restrictions on judicial review must be an analysis of how review
protects employer, union, and employee interests. Such an analysis suggests that while the protection of employee interests should
be of concern, such protection is consistent with certain significant
restrictions on judicial review.

A. Employer and Union Interests in Board Certification
Decisions
Identifying the employer's practical interest in Board certification decisions is not difficult. The union's certification as the collective bargaining representative of a unit of employees means
that the employer is legally obligated to bargain in good faith with
the union regarding employee compensation and other terms and
certification petition in order to restrict employers' opportunities to use their dominant economic position to intimidate employees unfairly before representational
votes. See Weiler, supra note 6, at 1770, 1811-16. Threatening the political assumptions of "free contracting" even further than does the make-whole remedy, Weiler
also proposes that whenever an employer engages in repeated bad-faith manipulations
of bargaining to stall the negotiation of a first contract, the Board should order that
the contract be arbitrated by some neutral party. See Weiler, supra note 8, at 405.
Each proposal has merit. Neither proposal, however, addresses the imbalance of the
present system of judicial review or the effects of postelection litigation delay on
union support within the bargaining unit. The latter delay is as important as the preelection delay addressed by Weller's first proposal because, as Weiler stresses, the critical achievement of unions in securing collective bargaining representational status is a
viable first contract, not simply certification. See id. at 411 & n.200; Weller, supra
note 6, at 1808-11. First-contract arbitration would help secure first contracts in the
face of bad-faith employer bargaining table activities even more effectively than the
make-whole remedy; however, Weiler recognizes that such arbitration could undermine collective bargaining, and excessively burden the Board, if applied in more typical cases such as "refusal[s] to bargain in order to secure judicial review of a legal
challenge to the Board's certification." Weiler, supra note 8, at 408 n.194.

290

[VOL.

55:262

Labor Board Certification
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

conditions of employment. The employer's economic freedom is
thereby restricted by the Board's assertion of governmental
power.
It is, however, much more difficult to understand how this practical employer interest is protected from encroachment by section
9 or any other provision of the Labor Act. Section 9 directs the
Board to help determine whether a "majority of the employees" in
a "unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining" have
"designated or selected" a particular labor organization as their
"exclusive" representative. 133 The appropriateness of the unit is
to be determined by deciding whether this suggested unit will "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this [Act]."'1 34 These rights include the right to refrain from, as well as to engage in, collective bargaining, but they
do not include any employer right to refrain from bargaining. Section 9 thus seems to ask the Board to make its major certification
judgments by weighing possibly conflicting employee interests,
35
without consideration of any employer interest.
It is true that the Act directs employers to bargain collectively
with employee representatives "subject to the provisions of section [9(a)]."'1 36 This limitation on the employer's duty, however,
seems to address only the rights of employees to refrain from bargaining, which are in turn accommodated by section 9; it does not
seem to accommodate an employer's general interest in being free
from the restraints of collective bargaining. Indeed, the latter
would be inconsistent with the Act's express goal of "encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining."'' 37 For the
Labor Act, collective bargaining is a "good" that is only outweighed by adequate employee sentiment against it. 38
133. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)-(b) (1982).
134. Id. § 159(b).
135. Two relatively minor qualifications must be made. By excluding supervisory
- and by interpretation, managerial employees - from protection by the Board, the
Act accommodates an employer's interest in maintaining its authority structure and
productivity. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279 (1974) (approving
Board exclusion of managerial employees); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (excluding supervisors from the definition of employee). An employer's interest in having a loyal
force of security guards is also accommodated by § 9(b)(3) of the Act, which provides
that no bargaining unit shall be appropriate "if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce... rules to protect property...
or... the safety of persons ...." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982). However, these employer interests need not be accommodated in most certification decisions of the
Board for which judicial review is or could be sought. Such review could be made
specially available when these interests are allegedly threatened by the Board. See
infra notes 188-195 and accompanying text.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
137. Id § 151.
138. Employee sentiment against collective bargaining is weighted heavily by the
Act for two reasons: first, because the Act values the employees' freedom to choose
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In sum, the Act can be read to make the following statement on
an employer's authority to set the terms and conditions of employment of its employees within the Act's jurisdiction:
Under American statutory law any preexisting common law
right of employers to set the terms and conditions of employment by bargaining only with individual employees is abrogated.
Whenever the National Labor Relations Board determines that
the desire of a group of employees to engage in collective bargaining through a particular representative dominates the desire of other fellow employees to refrain from such bargaining,
you must bargain collectively with the chosen representative.
This reading suggests that an employer protesting the Board
certification decision underlying a bargaining order may not meet
the Supreme Court's prudential criteria for standing to obtain judicial review. Those criteria include the requirement that the interests injured by the administrative decision be within "the zone
139
of interest" protected by the act under which review is sought; it
is reasonable to view an employer's interest in being free of collective bargaining responsibility as unprotected by the National Labor Relations Act.
However, under section 10(f), the Act affords standing to "[a]ny
person aggrieved" by a final Board order in an unfair labor practice proceeding, regardless of whether the interests aggrieved are
within a zone protected by the Act. 140 Furthermore, the "zone of
interest" criterion is imposed only by the Administrative Procedure Act and not by Article III of the Constitution. 14 1 Congress
can authorize parties injured by administrative actions to seek judicial review of those actions whether or not the injuries involve a
right protected by the statute under which review is sought.142
how their terms, conditions, and employment will be set; and second, because a representative without majority employee support is unlikely to succeed in establishing a
stable collective bargaining relationship, at least in the face of employer resistance.
See infra text accompanying notes 176-177.
139. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977) (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1970) (tying "zone of interest" test to the
Administrative Procedure Act's grant of standing to those "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute," 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982)); Association of
DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 153 (same); Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283,
289-96 (D.C. Cir.) (applying the Supreme Court's "zone of interest" test), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 881 (1981); see also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (using
the same analysis without formal use of the test).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
141. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (explaining that the "zone" test is not
constitutionally mandated); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,100
n.6 (1979) (same); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19
(1976) (same).
142. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940) (interpreting section 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1982), as
conferring standing to seek judicial review of an FCC licensing procedure to a party
merely threatened with financial injury by that licensing procedure); Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that under section 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982), an unsuccessful bidder for a
government contract had standing to seek judicial review of the contract-letting pro-
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Congress can intend such authorization to enlist those injured 143
as
private assistants to the public guardians of statutory interests.
A strong case for employer standing to seek review of Board
certification decisions can be made based on a "private attorney
general" 144 theory. As noted above, employers certainly have a
strong practical interest in seeking the reversal of Board decisions
holding that employee rights to refrain from collective bargaining
are not unduly compromised by the certification of a bargaining
representative. In addition, they surely have more resources than
groups of individual employees with which to litigate vigorously;
they are also much less likely than individual employees to fear
15
the power of a certified union. 4
This argument can easily be converted into an analogous argument for granting unions symmetrical standing to challenge such
decisions. Unions also have intense practical interests in Board
decisions on whether or not to certify them as exclusive representatives. This interest seems outside those covered by an act
designed to protect employee rights to bargain collectively and
take other concerted action, but not designed to enhance the status of unions. It is consonant with the Act's theory, however, that
unions can be effective representatives of the employee interests
that the Act protects. Moreover, unions, like employers, have
more resources to litigate vigorously than do employees. Furthermore, just as employers are less intimidated by unions than are
individual employees, unions are less initimidated by employers
than are individuals. Therefore, an argument that the Act does
not need to provide for judicial review of all Board certification
decisions is incomplete without exploring why protecting employee interests accommodated by the Act does not call for providing such review to employees, and thus to employers and unions as
surrogates.
cedure, as such standing would serve the public interest in agency compliance with
protective procedures, mandated by Congress).
143. See Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 477. One could argue that the zone of interest
test does not challenge employers' standing to seek review of Board certification decisions because the test permits asserted interests to be "regulated" as well as "protected" by the statute being asserted. See Association of Data Processing,397 U.S. at
154. See also Clark v. Securities Indus. Ass'n. 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987) (providing the
fullest and most recent Supreme Court elaboration of the zone of interest test and
suggesting that the test is not intended "to be especially demanding" and does not
require a "congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.").
144. Association of Data Processing,397 U.S. at 154.
145. Cf. Weiler, supra note 6, at 1815 (maintaining that the best argument for employer participation in representational elections is that it aids informed employee
choice, not that it protects employer interests).
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B.

The Effects on Statutory Employee Interests of Restricting
JudicialReview
Two interrelated propositions explain why the Labor Act's protection of employee rights to refrain from, as well as to engage in,
collective bargaining1 4 6 would not be eroded by sharp restrictions
of judicial review of Board certification decisions. First, there is
no reason to believe that the number of judicial decisions that help
correct Board miscalculations of how to best balance employee
rights is significantly greater than the number of judicial decisions
that frustrate that balancing. Second, mistakes in judgment by
the Board during the certification process are unlikely to be as
harmful to the statutory rights of directly affected employees as
the delay caused by judicial review to correct those mistakes.
The first of the above two propositions is in part likely to be true
because few certification judgments turn on the interpretation of
congressional statements of law. 147 Most types of Board certification decisions instead require difficult, predictive judgments about
the probable effects of employer or employee actions in the workplace. As a result, judges with special competence in statutory interpretation have no comparative skill advantage over Board
officials who are at least minimally competent individuals concentrating on the regulation of industrial disputes. Determining the
appropriateness of a bargaining unit, for example, requires balancing a complex set of considerations and predictions about what is
likely to happen in a particular workplace. On one hand, larger
units can provide employees with more bargaining leverage and
thus may promise a fuller exercise of the collective bargaining
right. 148 Larger, more comprehensive units may also avoid compe146. Both the right to accept and the right to reject collective bargaining are embodied in sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, 159 (1982). As noted,
only units appropriate for assuring "employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by the [Act]" are to be accepted. Id. § 159(b). Furthermore, only
representatives supported by a "majority of the employees" in such units are to become exclusive representatives. Id. § 159(a). Section 8 protects the right of employees
to refrain from, and engage in, collective bargaining free from union as well as employer interference, and proscribes discrimination to "encourage" as well as to "discourage" union activity. Id. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2).
147. Congress has provided few direct statements of law in section 9. Section 9(b)
includes three specific directives to the Board concerning types of units that shall not
be considered appropriate. Combining guards in units of other employees is proscribed. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982). Also, combining professional employees in units
with nonprofessionals without the consent of such professionals, is proscribed. Idc
§ 159(b)(1). This was the provision at issue in Leedom v. Kyne, see supra note 52.
Lastly, section 9(b) contains a clarification that the Board is not to find a craft unit
inappropriate simply because a different unit has already been established by the
Board, unless a majority of the craft employees vote for inclusion in the larger unit.
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1)-(2) (1982). Section 9(c)(5) contains another specific directive
on bargaining units: the Board is not to make the extent of a union's organizational
efforts "controlling" when it determines unit appropriateness. I&r§ 159(c)(5). The
only other specific section relevant to the certification process precludes the holding
of an election within 12 months of a prior election, grants the Board authority to determine the eligibility of economic strikers to vote in representation elections, and
provides a rule for runoff elections whenever "no choice" garners a majority in the
first vote. See id, § 159(c)(3).
148. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 164-65 (1941).
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tition between smaller, fractionated units.1 49 On the other hand,
smaller units subordinate the collective bargaining choices of
fewer employees, and representatives of such units can give more
attention to the specialized needs of individual workers. 150 Moreover, when no union has been successful in organizing the larger,
more comprehensive unit, the smaller unit may give employees
their only chance to achieve collective bargaining of any sort. 51
The Board must therefore make predictions about the capacity of
a smaller unit to achieve effective collective bargaining, the likelihood of a larger unit being organized, or the ability of a larger unit
to serve specialized employee needs. Unless one views the federal
judiciary as an intellectual elite, there is no reason to believe that
these legal generalists can make such predictive judgments as well
as competent Board members who decide only labor cases. For
with the exception of a few rules of limited application,152 the Act
says nothing about how to balance the complex considerations relevant in defining bargaining units to advance employee rights.
Federal judges have no comparative advantage in making other
section 9 determinations either. Most employer and union challenges to the validity of elections turn not on interpretation of
congressional intent but on judgments about the credibility of testimonial and other evidence or on predictions about the probable
effects of employer, union, or employee election activity. Deciding
whether employees' representational election votes were influenced by fraudulent representations, threats, or election-day gratuities, or deciding whether any of this activity occurred, is
a
15 3
challenge better suited to labor specialists than to generalists.
The formal law on review of Board certification decisions may
seem to adequately acknowledge the Board's comparative advan149. See Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397 (1966) (stating that the
"degree of integration of the employer's production processes" is a "relevant ... area
of inquiry" when considering the appropriateness of a craft unit).
150. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1971).
151. Section 9(c)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1982), states that "the extent
to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling" for the Board when
"determining whether a unit is appropriate." The Board, however, takes into account
the likelihood of organization in order to fulfill its mandate to "assure to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by [the Act]," including the
right to bargain collectively. Id. § 159(b); see P. Ballantine & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 1103,
1106 (1963); see also NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1965)
(stating that the extent of organization cannot be considered by the Board as the sole
factor, although it can be considered as one factor).
152. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), (c)(1)-(3), (c)(5) (1982).
153. This is one reason why Congress created the Board in the first place. See Winter, JudicialReview of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Cour 1968 SuP.
CT. REv. 53, 59 n.5 (noting that "[t]he creation of the Board, therefore, may fairly be
viewed as the result of congressional dissatisfaction with judicial law-making in the
area of labor law").
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tage. The Supreme Court has stressed that "Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion" in insuring
"the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees. 1 54 Furthermore, general administrative law doctrine and
provisions in the Labor Act can be read to confine statutory judicial review1 55 to determining: (1) whether the Board gave what
the courts view as adequate substantive consideration to factors
relevant under the Act; 56 (2) whether substantial evidence supported the Board's factual findings;1 57 and (3) whether the Board's
decision was consistent with its own substantive and procedural
doctrines and rules, as well as the few specific directives Congress

included in section

9.158

Lower courts, however, often have not been constrained by formal limits on judicial review from substituting their own predictions for those of the Board about such matters as how employees
will be affected by election activity or by acceptance of a particular
bargaining unit.1 5 9 Moreover, a judicial shift of the Board's
154. NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946); see also NLRB v. Action
Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (discussing the Board's broad discretion to
determine the appropriate bargaining unit); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.
759, 767 (1969) (stating that "Congress granted the Board a wide discretion to ensure
the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives"); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life
Ins., 380 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1965) (warning reviewing courts against substituting their
discretion or counsel's rationale for that of Board); May Dep't Stores v. NLRB, 326
U.S. 376, 380 (1945) (stating that courts give only limited judicial review to the Board's
determination of the appropriate bargaining unit); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,
322 U.S. 111, 134 (1944) (stating that Congress, "informed of the need for flexibility in
shaping the [bargaining] unit to the particular case," accordingly gave the Board wide
discretion in the area). But see NLRB v. State Plating & Finishing Co., 738 F.2d 733,
737-38 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that although Board has broad rulemaking discretion
to ensure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees, the
Board's application of the rules to the facts of a particular case is not equally discretionary, and warrants a stricter standard of review); Mosey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 701
F.2d 610, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (same).
155. Review of administrative decisions for conformity with the Constitution is, of
course, also appropriate.
156. Section 706(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires judicial reversal of decisions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The Court has interpreted this
language to authorize judicial review of "whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
157. The Labor Act provides for judicial acceptance of Board findings of fact "if
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e), (f) (1982).
158. Section 706(2)(C) and (D) authorize reviewing courts to determine whether
agency decisions are "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right," or "without observance of procedure required by law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), (D) (1982). In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court stated that reviewing courts
generally are not free to impose their own procedural requirements on administrative
agencies. Id. at 543-45.
159. See, e.g., NLRB v. Island Film Processing, 784 F.2d 1446, 1451-53 (9th Cir. 1986)
(substituting court's judgment for that of the Board on the question of whether prounion supervisors created a fear of retaliation in employee voters); NLRB v. State Plating & Finishing Co., 738 F.2d 733, 739 (6th Cir. 1984) (substituting court's judgment for
that of the Board concerning the likely effect on employee choice of a legal statement
by Board representative); NLRB v. Eurodrive, Inc., 724 F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1984)
(independently determining that racially charged statements by union organizer were
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balancing of employee rights usually accompanies even those judicial reversals of Board certification decisions that do observe formal judicial review doctrines. This is especially clear in light of
the effect of any delay on the exercise of employee rights. When
deciding not to employ particular procedures or make additional
considerations before its final decision, the Board weighs the likelihood that these extra procedures will enable the Board to better
protect employee rights against the effects of both delay and possible diversion of Board resources.1 60 Judicial rejection of the adequacy of the evidence supporting a Board's certification decision
usually reflects a different perspective on the relative weights to
be given to the risks that employees "truly" want or do not want
collective bargaining as offered by the union seeking certification. 6 1 Except in those rare cases in which the court can rely on
clear congressional intent, even reviewing Board certification decisions for consistency with Board- or Congress-made legal rules
requires reconsideration of the Board's weighing of employee interests. The Board presumably decides not to apply a particular
"likely to have had an appreciable effect upon the employees' freedom of choice");
NLRB v. Labor Servs., Inc., 721 F.2d 13, 17 (Ist Cir. 1983) (refusing to enforce order
requiring employer to bargain with union that purchased drinks for some employees
on the day of a representational election, although the Board had decided that the
vote was not affected); Szabo Food Servs. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 705, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1976)
(rejecting a Board-approved bargaining unit as too small because the Board's balance
of factors gave too much weight to the distinct interests of unit employees and the
likelihood of organization of a larger unit); Alpers' Jobbing Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 402,
406 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to accept Board certification because evidence suggested
that a critical pro-union voter intended to vote against the union, although the Board's
general policy is to honor actual votes, rather than evidence of intent). In one decision, even the Supreme Court substituted its judgment for the Board's on the likely
effect of union election activity on employee votes. See NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 270, 278 (1974) (finding that union promise to waive initiation fees for employees
who signed authorization cards prior to election, was likely to bribe or persuade employees to vote for the union on secret ballots).
160. In NLRB v. Lorimar Prods., 771 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1985), the court declined
to accept a Board certification because the Board had refused to allow employees to
consider whether they wanted the same union representation in a smaller bargaining
unit. Id at 1302. On the eve of the election, the Board decided to review a Regional
Director's bargaining unit determination, but permitted the election to proceed to
avoid delay. Id. at 1297. The Board impounded the ballots and, after deciding that the
unit should not include some confidential employees, counted only the votes of those
employees properly within the unit. I& As dissenting Judge Harry Pregerson understood, the court disagreed with the Board on whether delay outweighed the possibility
that the election could have come out differently if proper unit voters had understood
the size of the unit. See id at 1303; see also Hamilton Test Sys. v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 136,
140 (2d Cir. 1984) (in accord with Lorimar majority).
161. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 732
F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1984), provides an example. In that case, the court refused to accept the judgments of the Board and an administrative law judge on the credibility of
conflicting witnesses. The court struck a different balance than did the Board between the risk that employees might have been unfairly influenced by the union and
the risk that anti-union employees were attempting to frustrate the election process.
Id at 1291-93.
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rule only when it perceives that the application would not best
advance employee rights to refrain from or engage in effective col162
lective bargaining.
Any legal reformer anxious to see the goals of the Labor Act
achieved thus can be skeptical about whether the judiciary will
make fewer mistakes than the Board in regulating the certification process, unless the reformer has reason to calculate that the
judiciary's balancing of employee rights is more likely than that of
the Board to conform with his or her own. Such a calculation is
difficult to make. In fact, a federal judiciary appointed by a given
president or set of presidents is perhaps less likely to share the
values of the Act than is a group of Board members appointed by
the same president or presidents. Federal judges, removed from
concerns about job security by the protection of life tenure, and
tending to view themselves as members of an elite club, may have
great difficulty appreciating the problems facing most workers.
Furthermore, most judges are steeped in a liberal intellectual
tra1 63
dition that stresses individual rather than collective rights.
To some extent, restricting judicial review would magnify shifts
in the balance of employee rights struck by the Board, as the
Board membership shifts with the ideological inclinations of the
occupants of the White House.1 64 A president may appoint judges,

as he appoints Board members, with an eye toward the appointees'
likely agreement with his own values. Given the broad range of
issues with which judges must deal, however, a president cannot
be assured that his judicial appointees share his ideological orien162. In NLRB v. Gulf States Canners, 585 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit
refused to accept a union election victory because the Board had applied an incorrect
legal test to a challenge of a union purchase of $30.00 worth of gasoline for two employees. I&Lat 759. The court claimed that the Board, simply by adopting the opinion
of its regional director, had based its decision on an incorrect legal standard - the
union's lack of intent to influence the election - rather than on the objective
likelihood that the election had been influenced. Id However, whether or not the
court's characterization of the Board's opinion was correct, the remand had the effect
of upsetting the Board's balancing of the risks to timely, effective collective bargaining against the risks to free employee choice.
163. This intellectual tradition may be one reason why federal judges were so inhospitable to collective employee action before their discretion was limited by the
Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 101-115 (1982). See C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND
THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 44-52, 117-18 (1985). Another reason may be the natural ten-

dency of powerful, influential men to identify with a dominant, rather than a
subordinate, social class. Whether ideology or class identification better explains the
historical judicial discomfort with labor unions, there is no reason to believe the underlying discomfort has abated. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof
American LaborLaw, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1458-62 (1971) (explaining resistance to
unions in the United States by American culture of individualism).
It may be revealing that during fiscal year 1985, when courts began to review decisions of a Labor Board that collective bargaining advocates have vigorously criticized,
the courts of appeals upheld 83.5% of Board decisions. In no fiscal year in the preceding decade had the Board succeeded in more than 74% of its cases. Data from Elliot
Moore, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Appellate Court Branch, Division of Enforcement, NLRB (on file with author).
164. The Board historically has reflected the philosophy of the administration that
appointed its members. See Bok, supra note 163, at 1452.
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tations toward collective bargaining to the same extent he can be
assured his appointments to the Labor Board share these orientations. Furthermore, few presidents can appoint a dominant proportion of the federal judiciary as quickly as they can appoint a
majority of the Labor Board. Finally, and perhaps most important, a new judiciary is likely to feel more constrained by the precedent of prior judicial interpretations of the Act than a new
Board is likely to feel constrained by a prior Board's applications
of it.
Magnifying shifts in Board certification policy, however, should
not necessarily be troublesome. 16 5 The average balance of employee rights struck in relatively variant Board decisions is just as
likely to reflect the Labor Act's values as is the balance struck by
relatively constant Board decisions. Moreover, Congress could rationally intend Board policy on representational matters to shift
markedly with the political winds.166 If shifts in Board policy are
sufficiently extreme, perhaps we should be less concerned with
the average case over time and more concerned about the distortion of employee attitudes toward collective bargaining imposed at
the extremes. But such extreme shifts in policy seem unrealistic
for two interrelated reasons. First, a Board significantly freed of
the restraints of judicial review will still be under the scrutiny of
the contending factions in labor disputes and of the congressional
representatives of those factions. Even if congressional critics of a
particular Board cannot restrain it through budgetary control or
threatened restrictions of authority, they can create a political issue out of egregious policy shifts. 167 Second, Board members must
appreciate that governmental regulation of labor relations can
only be effective if viewed as legitimate by labor and management,
as well as by the general public. A Board unconcerned about
maintaining that legitimacy would provoke a crisis of industrial
order that would surely engender a political backlash.168 Realistically, a Board could insulate itself from such political restraints
165. The Board's relative freedom from stare decisis seems to be one reason Congress invested the Board with the primary authority to administer the Act. See Winter, supra note 153, at 63-64.
166. See Diver, StatutoryInterpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 580 (1985) (discussing the argument that legislatures may expect agencies to
respond to current policy preferences rather than the preferences of the previous enacting legislature).
167. See Weiler, The Administrative TribunaL A View From the Inside, 26 U. ToRON'rO L.J. 193, 209-10 (1976) (explaining how the British Columbia Labor Board has
been constrained despite being free of most judicial review).
168. Contemporary union leaders, distraught with a concatenation of "Reagan
Board" decisions adverse to union interests, have indeed begun to question the legitimacy of the present order by suggesting that unions might be better off without the
present kind of governmental regulation. See, e.g., 30 AFL-CIO News, Oct. 12,1985, at
5, col. 1. These leaders have not been vociferous or militant enough to credibly
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only in an extreme antilabor or antimanagement political climate
that would control judicial review as well.

A more unstable federal policy on certification decisions would
also have little general impact. Policies regulating the certification process do not form the basis for any commercial planning.
Nor would shifts in such policies disrupt established collective

bargaining relationships; they merely affect the likelihood of es-

tablishing new relationships. 169 Moreover, shifts in Board certification policy cannot unfairly expose any party to governmental
coercion that it would not have expected before the shift. The
only governmental coercion likely to result from a shift in certification policy is an order to an employer to bargain collectively;
and such an order is hardly unfair, regardless of an employer's
expectations, when it is determined that the employees desire collective representation.
It is noteworthy that the sharply restricted judicial review of
representation decisions permitted under the Railway Labor Act
(RLA) 170 has not led to accusations of extreme, irresponsible, or
unsettling swings in National Mediation Board (NMB) decision-

making.1 71 Under the Supreme Court's decision in Switchmen's
Union v. National MediationBoard,172 judicial review of NMB de-

cisions in representational disputes in the railroad and airline industries is at least as restricted as direct review of NLRB

decisions.

73

The RLA experience may not be fully predictive be-

threaten a breakdown of industrial order, but credible threats to the legitimacy of
labor-management relations law could restrain the present Board.
169. Because the arguments in favor of restricting judicial review of Board decisions do not apply to Board decisions concerning decertification, unit clarification, or
certification amendments, the present level of judicial review applied to them need
not be modified.
170. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
171. See generally Eischen, RepresentationDisputes and Their Resolution in the
Railroad and Airline Industries, in THE RAILWAY ACT AT FIFTY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDusTRIES 23 (C. Rehmus ed. 1976) (discussing the history and effects of the court's deference to the National Mediation Board on
representation matters).
172. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
173. Id. at 300. The Railway Labor Act does not establish unfair labor practices,
nor does it provide any other vehicle for Mediation Board enforcement of its representational decisions. A certified representative seeking to enforce a bargaining obligation must directly seek a federal court injunction of the employer. See Virginian
Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548-49 (1937). The Switchmen's Court reserved the question of whether the judiciary should give greater review to a Mediation Board certification when a certified union seeks judicial assistance. 320 U.S. at
307; see also Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of NonContract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 659 (1965) (asserting that Switchmen's and Leedom
v. Kyne are in full accord); United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1366-68 (5th Cir.
1969) (reconciling Switchmen's with Kyne by stating that Switchmen's applies to nonfinal orders, but not enforcement actions). This reservation, however, has not generated significant judicial reconsideration of Mediation Board certifications. See, e.g.,
Aeronautical Radio v. NMB, 380 F.2d 624, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that even enforcement courts should not review NMB representational decisions made after an
adequate NMB investigation of the dispute). There are few reported cases in which
unions have sought judicial enforcement of NMB certifications, perhaps because most
railway and airline unions have had adequate economic leverage to compel bargaining. See International In-Flight Catering Co. v. NMB, 555 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1977)
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cause of the post-RLA employer acceptance of collective bargaining in the railroad and, until recently, airline industries.
Nevertheless, the lack of significant public or congressional dissatisfaction with, or judicial erosion of, Switchmen's at least supports
conducting a similar experiment in industries where employer
resistance to unions has been more salient.
Less likely than aggravated shifts in Board policy making, but of
greater concern, is Board bias for or against particular employers
or unions - bias based on calculations of interest by individual
Board members, rather than on ideological inclinations as expressed in general policy.174 However, there are processes other
than judicial for the disclosure of flagrant bias in our democracy,
including congressional oversight and the press. Even a president
who appointed a delinquent Board member has an interest in that
member's removal for cause. 1 75 Moreover, direct review of Board
certification decisions for the detection of improper motivation on
the part of Board members does not require direct review under
the broad, currently used standard.
Although judicial review of certification decisions thus does not
generally enhance the fulfillment of the free choice of employees
concerning collective bargaining, such review may ensure some recourse to individual employees affected by the most extreme decisions of a future Board. Individual employees affected by an
extreme doctrinal swing are not consoled by either the knowledge
that a future Board will right the imbalance in future cases, or by
the knowledge that their plight will not proliferate in most political climates. It is also true that external overseers, whether or
not judicial, may have difficulty confidently discerning a bias for
or against particular employers or unions expressed in a particularized judgment on the facts of an individual case.
The current level of judicial review of Board certification decisions, however, cannot be justified persuasively by the protection
of the rights of employees directly affected by these decisions.
Most of the Board's mistakes in judgment during the certification
process are probably less harmful to the statutory rights of directly affected employees than is the delay occasioned by judicial
review.
(suggesting that union economic power explains why employers do not want to wait
for unions to seek judicial enforcement of NMB certifications).
174. All those affiliated with the Board in the last half century can be proud that
there has never been a representation or election scandal. See H.R. REP. No. 342-46,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1976). Nevertheless, the potential for interest-based bias of
Board members cannot be completely discounted.
175. Presidents want effective, not personally tainted, advocates of their policies.
Any president can judge when it is less politically damaging to force an executive's
resignation than to indulge his continuation in office.
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The rights of directly affected employees to refrain from collective bargaining certainly should not move a collective bargaining
advocate to accept judicial review of certification decisions. The
labor laws ensure that a majority of employees can relatively
quickly escape the authority of a certified bargaining representative that it does not support. As suggested above, Board certification generally is a necessary condition for the establishment of a
collective bargaining relationship in the face of employer opposition; but it is not the only condition. To convince a resistant employer to enter into a first contract that will demonstrate the
benefits of collective bargaining to a unit of employees, a certified
union usually must have the kind of strong majority support that
justifies certification in the first place. Without that support, a
union is generally not able to present the credible threat of collective action that would impel the employer to compromise.
Furthermore, after a year of frustrated bargaining after the certification decision, the Board will respond to decertification petitions filed on behalf of employees who wish to refrain from
bargaining. 176 The Board, to be sure, may block the processing of
such petitions during its consideration of a serious unfair labor
practice charge against the employer for bargaining in bad faith, 177
but well-counseled employers can avoid significant compromises
in a collective agreement without actually committing an unfair
labor practice. In those circumstances, the union has no basis for
continuing to delay a decertification election. In most instances
when an employer resists bargaining, therefore, employees can escape incorrect Board certification decisions before a first contract
is signed - often in the same time it would take a court to reverse
the Board.
For several reasons, however, unions lacking the support of a
majority of employees in a unit may be able to secure first contracts. Most important, some unions can impose extra-bargaining
unit pressure on an employer by provoking sympathetic job actions by other organized employees. In the face of such job actions, or at least their threat, unions with sufficiently strong
support of even a minority of unit employees may secure a collective agreement that reflects substantial employer compromises.
In addition, a union desperately wishing to secure the protection
of a collective agreement might be willing to accept a diluted
agreement offered by a hard bargaining, resistant employer.
Even the attainment of a first contract does not mean that a
long collective bargaining relationship will be established against
176. During the first year after certification, the Board will not consider a decertification petition absent unusual circumstances. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98
(1954); Taft Broadcasting, 201 N.L.R.B. 801, 802 (1973). After the expiration of the
certification year, the Board entertains both employee decertification petitions with a
minimal 30% showing of nonsupport, as well as employer petitions based on a good
faith and reasonably grounded doubt of the union's continued majority status. See
Taft Broadcasting, 201 N.L.R.B. at 802-03.
177. See Town & Country, 194 N.L.R.B. 1135, 1135-36 (1971).
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the will of a majority of employees in that unit, however. It is far
from rare for first contracts not to be followed by additional agreements, 178 and a first contract that offers little to employees will
probably undergird the resolve of some to achieve the representative's decertification at the next opportunity.
To be sure, the Board's contract bar doctrine means that the
next opportunity may not come for three years after the signing of
the first contract,'179 and a collective bargaining agreement that is
attractive to unit employees may convince a sizable majority to
support the union even if it had lacked majority support at the
time of the election.18 0 This should not, however, concern a fairminded labor law reformer. The idea of "true" employee sentiment toward a collective representative is a fictional construct.
All electoral sentiments are constantly shifting products of particular circumstances and times. A representational decision made
after an experience with collective bargaining may be a better,
more educated, and studied expression of unit sentiment than a
decision made before such an experience. This view arguably supports either establishing collective bargaining on the basis of less
certain expressions of union support than secret ballots, or eliminating preelection opportunities for employers to influence employee sentiment.' 8 ' At the least, it suggests deferring
reconsideration of good-faith Board certification decisions until
employees have a few years of experience with collective
bargaining.
The same analysis applies to those instances in which an employer does not resist and freely bargains an agreement with a
union that the Board may have incorrectly certified. Denying judicial review of the certification decision to any dissident or rival
group of employees - in almost all cases, a rival union - probably means that the rival group will have to experience the certified representative for a three-year contract. If the union proves
itself an effective enough representative during that period to
shift employee sentiment its way, however, it is hard to see how
employee rights ultimately have been significantly compromised.
It is one thing for the Board and courts to conclude that obviously
178. The AFL-CIO study of union election victories in the 1979-1980 period
revealed that about one of eight first contracts obtained from these victories was not
followed by a successor agreement. Memorandum from Charles McDonald to National Organizing Committee (Feb. 18, 1983) (copy of file at the George Washington
Law Review).
179. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
180. Cf International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736 (1961)
(stating that an employer commits an unfair labor practice by recognizing a minority
union, even when that union later achieves majority status).
181. See Weiler, supra note 6, at 1806-16.
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nonneutral employers should be prohibited from independently
vesting favored units with a cloak of authority, even if that cloak
turns out to cover effective, independent unions that develop majority support.18 2 It is quite another to contend that the protection
of employee collective bargaining rights is significantly sacrificed
by cloaks provided in good faith by an administrative Board.
Given the continuing protection of section 8(a)(2) against employer interference with unions, an experiment with collective
bargaining through a credible, if wrongly certified, bargaining representative is better than inhibiting all collective bargaining
18 3
through broad judicial review.
Nor can judicial review of most Board certification decisions be
justified by the protection it affords directly affected employees
who wish to engage in, rather than refrain from, collective bargaining. As stressed above,18 4 the delay associated with judicial review prevents courts from reversing most of the damage to
employee rights to engage in collective bargaining caused by incorrect Board certification decisions. To overcome the effects of
Board certification decisions that discourage collective bargaining,
a union must engage in renewed organizational efforts, whether
or not the courts review and reverse those decisions. As a consequence, employees whose desire to engage in collective bargaining
is directly inhibited by Board certification decisions can only significantly benefit from judicial review in a limited set of cases those involving decisions relevant to their future organizational
and election campaigns among the same group of employees. Only
the reversal of these decisions, which include determinations of
the Board's jurisdiction and of the appropriateness of bargaining
units, are likely to be important to directly affected employees'
chances to engage in collective bargaining at all.185
182. See InternationalLadies Garment Workers, 366 U.S. at 736.
183. A limitation on judicial review that balances effective, stable collective bargaining against full deference to shifting employee sentiments toward unions would
accord with other labor law doctrine. For instance, the board's certification and contract bar rules, see supra notes 176 and 179 and accompanying text, clearly
subordinate employees' changing feelings about unions to the Act's alternative goal of
stable collective bargaining. A similar subordination is the basis for the Board's requirement that new employers taking over the operations and employees of predecessor employers must also assume the prior employer's bargaining obligations, without
an opportunity for a formal expression of employee sentiment toward the union. See
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1972). Even the Labor Board of
the 1980s has developed new doctrine that rests on the value of stable collective bargaining as outweighing the scrupulous protection of free employee choice. See RCA
del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963, 965 (1982) (holding that an employer may negotiate
a new collective bargaining agreement with an incumbent union during pendency of
certification petition filed by a second union).
The introductory section of the Act itself declares the policy of the United States to
be "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" as well as "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association.., and designation of
representatives of their own choosing .. " 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see also Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (noting that effective collective bargaining and freedom of association are complementary policies of the Act).
184. See supra text accompanying note 108.
185. Reversal of a Board decision to reject a single office bargaining unit, for exam-
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Not all Board certification decisions potentially relevant to future organizational and election campaigns among the same group
of employees should be subject to judicial review, however. Most
such decisions, including those determining appropriate bargaining units, are better guided by those with specialized experience
with labor relations than by courts experienced in interpreting
congressional directives. Only when Board decisions relevant to
future organizational campaigns also primarily depend upon the
interpretation of a particularized expression of congressional intent is judicial review compelling as a device for protecting employee rights to engage in collective bargaining.
C

A Specific Proposalfor RestrictingReview

The next element of the case for sharp restriction of review of
Board certification decisions must be the carving out of sufficient,
but limited, workable exceptions to a general presumption of
nonreviewability. Without such exceptions, any presumption will
eventually be bent and broken by equitably appealing cases.
Three good starting points exist: the above analysis of the kinds of
cases in which judicial review might best offer protection to employee statutory rights, the developed exceptions to the general
presumption against direct district court review of Board certification decisions, and the exceptions to the rules against judicial review of Mediation Board decisions in representational disputes
under the RLA.-86 From these points of reference, several categories of cases emerge in which direct judicial review seems appropriate after Board termination of the certification process.1 8 7
This Article has suggested two or three possible limited exceptions. First, permitting judicial consideration of a claim that a
Board certification decision was based on a bribe or some other
illegitimate motivation is most clearly appropriate. Such review
might simply focus on whether the Board made a series of goodfaith judgments, uncorrupted by connection to particular unions
or employers. On one hand, this should constitute a very narrow
exception to a general rule against review, because few nonfrivolous claims of improper motivation will be made against Board
members. On the other hand, the exception is potentially important in the rare case, because reviewing judges are capable of ferreting out improper motivation.
ple, would make organization easier for a union and could thus expand collective bargaining opportunities.
186. See supra text accompanying note 172.
187. For the reasons explained above, see supra notes 99-103 and accompanying
text, any permitted judicial review should be direct and independent of the commission of unfair labor practices.
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Challenges to the Board's assertion or denial of jurisdiction over
employees seeking certification of a bargaining unit are also especially attractive candidates for direct judicial review. Mediation
Board decisions on the jurisdictional scope of the RLA provide one
of the settled qualifications to the Switchmen's rule against review,188 and Labor Board jurisdictional decisions should also be
viewed as exceptional.1 8 9 Denying jurisdiction to consider a petition of employees seeking to engage in collective bargaining is
more significant than any other type of Board certification decision. As long as the Board adheres to such a decision, the employees' immediate organizational efforts, as well as all further
organizational efforts, will fail to obtain governmentally supported collective bargaining. 190 In addition, the Board's assertion
of jurisdiction is an appropriate topic for review to balance any
inherent administrative tendency either to avoid new problems or
to attempt to expand authority.19 ' Finally, the statutory definitions of employee and employer, which express congressional intent to limit the Board's jurisdiction, are sufficiently specific to be
suitable for molding by the judiciary's general skills of statutory
92
interpretation.1
Any exception that permits review of underlying jurisdictional
determinations, however, must be carefully framed to ensure that
litigants do not persuade courts to characterize any alleged certification mistake of the Board as "jurisdictional", because it was beyond the Board's statutory authority. 93 This exception should
provide for the reviewability only of Board decisions interpreting
the statutory meaning of "employee" or "employer" for the pur188. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Assoc. v. North Carolina Ports Auth.,
463 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v.
National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 688-89 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
189. Some courts have viewed jurisdictional issues as exceptions to the general rule
against direct review of Labor Board representational decisions. See, e.g., Florida Bd.
of Business Regulation v. NLRB, 497 F. Supp. 599, 600-04 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (reviewing
Board's assertion of jurisdiction over the jai alai industry), modified, 686 F.2d 1362
(11th Cir. 1982); cf.Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In Chaney, the Supreme
Court held that section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) (1982), codified the federal courts' traditional presumption that an
"agency's decision not to take enforcement action" is immune from review. 1d. at 832.
The Court noted that rebuttal of this presumption might be appropriate where the
agency refuses to proceed "based solely on the belief that it lacks jurisdiction." Id. at
833 n.4.
190. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
191. See Diver, supra note 166, at 582.
192. Courts might also play a role, albeit limited, in reviewing the exercise of the
Board's more open-ended, legislatively granted discretion to decline jurisdiction over
classes or categories of employers when it deems the effects of these employers' labor
relations on interstate commerce insignificant. See Southern Dolomite, 129 N.L.R.B.
1342, 1343-45 (1961); 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1982); supra note 19. Judicial review to
ensure that the Board has not unreasonably sacrificed important authority cannot in
any way threaten rights of employees to refrain from or engage in collective
bargaining.
193. Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,198-99 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's use of jurisdictional language to approve direct review of the
Board's substantive certification decision).
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194
poses of defining those over whom the Board has authority.
Another exception might be carved out for any Board certification decision that interprets specific congressional limitations on
the Board's certification authority, notably the four rules for
defining appropriate bargaining units in sections 9(b) and 9(c)(5),
and the rules on voter eligibility and the conduct of runoff elec-

tions contained in section 9(c)(3). 1 95 These rules, being specific

limitations on the Board's authority, are more suitably interpreted
by courts claiming to divine congressional will than by a policysetting Board. Furthermore, although the contravention of the
congressional intent expressed in these rules may not be as significant as the effects of the contravention of congressional intent
concerning the Board's jurisdiction, Congress's specificity in a generally open-textured section may express the importance of the
issues covered by the rules.
Any exception to congressional limits on the Board's certification authority, however, should not be expressed in an openended, generic fashion that allows judicial review to overturn
Board certification decisions as "contrary to a specific" or a "clear
and mandatory" prohibition in the Act. 196 If the alternative to

finding the violation of a "specific" or "clear and mandatory" directive is complete foreclosure of judicial review of a decision,
courts might reach to find more and more "specific" and "clear"
congressional intent in the provisions of section 9.197
The two other judicially developed exceptions to the general
194. But see supra note 192.
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), (c)(3), (c)(5) (1982); supra note 147.
196. See Kyne, 358 U.S. at 188 (using such general language to establish a standard
for determining when direct review of Board certification decisions should be permitted). It could prove difficult for courts to use the Kyne standard to define which
Board certifications ought to be reviewable at any time. As noted above, courts have
used the Kyne decision sparingly. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Such
spare use, however, has been facilitated by judicial realization that employers can easily and with little risk obtain review by simply refusing to bargain with the union
after certification. See, e.g., Leedom v. IBEW Local 108, 278 F.2d 237, 239 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (observing that "[b]y refusing to bargain with any newly elected representatives
of its employees, [a c]ompany will incur an unfair labor practice charge, against which
it may assert the illegality of the election as a defense").
197. Courts have not reached far to erode the Switchmen's rule against review of
Mediation Board representational decisions, see Eischen, supra note 171, at 29, but
this may be due to the relative stability of collective bargaining in the railway and
airline industries, see supra note 173. More recently, some courts have scrutinized
Mediation Board decisions more closely by citing the Board's vague "duty... to investigate" representational disputes, as provided in section 2, Ninth of the RLA, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Ninth (1982). See Russell v. NMB, 714 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding
NMB investigations inadequate), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); International InFlight Catering v. NMB, 555 F.2d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 1977) (same); see also Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380
U.S. 650, 661 (1965) (stating that the NMB's action is reviewable to the extent that it
bears on its performance of duty to investigate).
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rule against direct district court review of board certification decisions, however, should be included as exceptions to a presumption
against any judicial review of such decisions. One of these exceptions permits immediate review of Board certification decisions
that may affect the conduct of American foreign policy. 198 Adoption of this exception, obviously applicable to few cases and not
readily expandable to many more, should not significantly qualify
a presumption against review.
The other exception permits direct review of Board certification
decisions that raise nonfrivolous claims of a deprivation of a constitutional right. Courts have acknowledged a similar constitutional question exception to the Switchmen's rule against review
of NMB decisions. 199 The NLRA exception was pronounced by
the Second Circuit,200 not the Supreme Court, and the Board has
challenged it, at least where the alternative indirect, unfair labor
practice route to judicial review is available.201 If all alternative
routes to obtain judicial review were eliminated, however, this exception should be constitutionally mandated. The accepted doctrine that an administrative agency should not be the final judge
of the constitutionality of its own actions expresses a constitu20 2
tional principle.
A constitutional question exception also would not lead to review of many Board certification decisions. With one possible exception, plaintiffs have found no firm constitutional ground from
which to attack Board certification decisions. Even that exception
due process challenges to the Board's failure to hold a hearing
concerning some certification issues20 3 - would ultimately have to
198. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17
(1963).
199. See, e.g., Hunter v. NMB, 754 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to review
a final NIB action because plaintiff failed to make a "substantial showing" that the
action was unconstitutional); Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 714 F.2d 1332, 1340-41
(5th Cir. 1983) (stating that a Board action that violates the statutory rights of employees is reviewable); United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1366 (5th Cir. 1969) (citing
Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 21 (5th Cir. 1965)) (stating that
when a plaintiff makes a "substantial showing" that an action by the Board violated
that plaintiff's constitutional rights, the action is reviewable); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 402 F.2d 196, 205 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (stating that Board action of constitutional dimension or constituting gross statutory violation is reviewable); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NMVIB, 363 F.2d 311,
312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (indicating that plaintiffs face a heavy burden in demonstrating a
constitutional violation by the Board in order to obtain review).
200. See Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949).
201. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354, 358-60 (2d Cir. 1968).
202. Congress should not be able to circumvent the judicial protection of constitutional limits of governmental power by delegating authority to an executive agency
that it insulates from constitutional challenge. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
109 (1977) ("Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions."); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974); see also R.
BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 281-84 (1969) (stating that closing all

courts to claims of unconstitutional invasions frustrates the constitutional protections
intended by the Framers).
203. See, e.g., NLRB v. Claxton Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating
that due process requires the Board to grant a hearing to a losing party who supplies
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be narrowed by a Supreme Court decision that considered the undesirable ramifications for administrative
law of enlarging due
2 4
process protections under the Labor Act.

0

In sum, significant restrictions could be placed on judicial review of Board certification decisions without foreclosing review
necessary to protect individual rights secured by the Act. The
hold that the presumption in favor of judicial review has on the
imagination of American law reformers, however, probably reflects deeper political assumptions that cannot be addressed by the
statutory analysis employed above. Those deeper assumptions
concern the appropriate balance of governmental power in our society and are often characterized as having constitutional force.
This Article would thus be incomplete without consideration of
the constitutional issues raised by restricting review of the kind of
administrative decisions made during the certification process.
III.

The Constitutionalityof Restricting JudicialReview
of Board CertificationDecisions

Some prominent administrative law scholars expressly argue
that the Constitution requires certain administrative decisions to
be open to judicial review. 20 5 For them, the judiciary's constitutional role as a check on the power of the executive branch of government must include authority to review at least those
administrative decisions that form the basis of enforceable orders
against private parties. 20 6 Although the Supreme Court has never
squarely accepted this position, this position draws support from

some of the Court's language and analysis 20 7 and continues to in-

fluence judicial20 and, presumably, legislative decisionmaking.
Any argument in favor of restricting judicial review must offer a
theory of why our constitutional order permits such restrictions.
A brief for the constitutionality of the restrictions on judicial

prima facie evidence that would warrant setting an election aside). See generallyFarber, supra note 34, at 278-84 (discussing the constitutional right to a hearing on the
validity of a representation election).
204. Furthermore, it is hard to understand how employers objecting to Board certification procedures can assert any liberty or property interest that is protected by the
due process clause, because the Act subordinates employers' freedom from collective
bargaining to employees' free choice of bargaining representatives and effective collective bargaining. See NLRB v. ARA Servs., 717 F.2d 57, 67 (3d Cir. 1983); Utica Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 1967).
205. See sources cited supra note 3.
206. See L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 384; Hart, supra note 3, at 1362, 1379, 1384-85.
207. See sources cited supra note 2.
208. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)
(upholding an administrative arbitration system not subject to traditional judicial review, but noting that the judiciary is not primarily relied upon for enforcement of
arbitration orders).
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review advocated above can rest substantially on the Supreme
20 9
Court's decision in Switchmen's v. National Mediation Board.
This decision accepted National Mediation Board decisions on representation disputes in the transportation industry as nonreviewable. Switchmen's is now over four decades old, but it has been
cited with approval by the current Court. In a 1985 decision,
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 2 10 the Court
stressed that "[mI]any matters that involve the application of legal
standards to facts and affect private interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no review by Article III
courts." 211 The opinion
cited Switchmen's as providing an exam21 2
ple of such matters.
The Court's recent reaffirmation of Switchmen's might settle
the constitutionality issue were it not for influential commentary
on judicial review of administrative action, primarily from Professors Henry Hart and Louis Jaffe. 213 They not only criticize, but
also attempt to limit Switchmen's (as well as other Supreme Court
precedent) in a manner that challenges the constitutionality of the
above proposed restrictions on review of Board certification decisions. Hart concludes, with Jaffe's endorsement, that whenever
an executive agency attempts to enlist the assistance of an Article
III court in the enforcement of one of its orders, it must subject
that order to the court's full review of its legality. 2 4 Hart and
Jaffe explain Switchmen's by stressing that the union seeking review was not an actual or prospective defendant in an enforcement action.2 1 5 The union wished to set aside the Mediation
Board's designation of a rival union as bargaining representative,
but its lack of success in doing so would not subject it to the burden of "any enforceable duty not to bargain. 2 16 It would only
deny the petitioning union the benefit of a governmental order to
the employer to bargain instead with it. Hart argues that denying
an employer judicial review of the Mediation Board's representational decisions before ordering that employer to bargain with the
designated union is sharply distinguishable from Switchmen's. He
also suggests that it is inconsistent with the judicial authority inherent in Article 111.217
Professor Hart's implicit challenge to any restriction of NLRA
review in cases to which he claims Switchmen's is not applicable
209. 320 U.S. 297 (1943); see Thomas, 473 U.S. at 588 (quoting Switchmen's, 320 U.S.

at 300-01).
210. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
211. Id. at 583.

212. See id. at 588. In a 1986 decision, the Court cited Switchmen's for the proposition that the presumption in favor of review "may be overcome by inferences of intent
drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole." Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 n.4 (1986).
213. See supra note 3.
214. See L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 384; Hart, supra note 3, at 1375-79, 1384-85.
215. See L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 383; Hart, supra note 3, at 1385.
216. See Hart, supra note 3, at 1385.
217. Id.
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cannot be quickly dismissed. Hart's efforts to protect the law-declaring authority of enforcement courts ostensibly explains numerous Supreme Court decisions upholding denials of judicial
review of executive decisions not to confer benefits on private
parties. Under Hart's thesis, these decisions do not compromise
the right of private parties to obtain review of the legality of executive actions that affect their property or person.2 18 Hart's thesis
continues to be cited in the most recent Supreme Court decisions
interpreting restrictions on judicial review. The Thomas Court,
for instance, stressed that the arbitration scheme challenged there
incorporated its own enforcement system, which involved the judiciary "only tangentially, if at all ... ."219 Similarly, in Heckler v.
Chaney,220 the Court supported its holding that the Administrative Procedure Act expresses a presumption against the reviewability of an agency's decision not to take enforcement action by
noting that "when an agency refuses to act it generally does not
exercise its underlying coercive power over an individual's liberty
or property .... ,,221
Nevertheless, Hart's thesis has become increasingly vulnerable
to challenge because it is based on a legally outmoded distinction
between judicially created and legislatively created rights. Hart
would grant greater protection to common law property rights,
such as an employer's right to run its business without special bargaining obligations, than it would grant to legislatively defined
rights, such as a union's right to bargain as the exclusive representative of a unit of employees in which it enjoys majority support. As the implications of legal positivism have been absorbed
by the courts and legislatures, however, our law has increasingly
recognized that the source of a property right should not be relevant to determining the level of protection it deserves; the government's denial of a legislatively conferred benefit should not be
distinguished from new governmental restrictions on old common
law property rights. 222
The erosion of the distinction underlying Hart's thesis is re218. See, e.g., United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 206 (1982) (upholding
nonreviewability of private insurer's dispensation of Medicare funds); Chicago & S.

Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948) (holding nonreviewable an
order denying airline a license to fly certain routes); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 497, 517 (1840) (holding decision of Secretary of Navy regarding grant of pension
to widow not reviewable).
219. 473 U.S. at 591.
220. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
221. IdL at 832.
222. The modern Supreme Court has never viewed property rights under the due

process clause as natural rights. On this issue, at least, all Justices have been positivists. See Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1300-02 (1982).
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flected in a series of developments in modern administrative law
which rejects a pre-New Deal model of government that elevates
the protection of common law rights and considers statutory
rights as only exceptional and subordinate. 2 23 The Administrative
Procedure Act codifies these developments. 224 More important,
in decisions dating back at least to Goldberg v. Kelly,225 the Court
has recognized that the source of a property right, be it historical
common law or contemporary legislation, should not affect the
level of constitutional protection it receives. Recently, in Cleveland Board of Educationv. Loudermill,226 the Court rejected Justice Rehnquist's view that legislatures can procedurally qualify
any substantive right that they have the power to create, reflecting the Court's appreciation that judicially created and legislatively created property rights should not be constitutionally
distinguished. 227 Justice Rehnquist's analysis applies to all judicially created property rights that the legislature has authority to
redefine, modify, or substantively qualify. The Court may have
reasoned that it could not have accepted Rehnquist's position
without also accepting a legislature's authority to define what
processes are due parties whose common-law property rights
22 8
could be affected by that legislature.
223. See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency InactionAfter Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CH.
L. REv. 653, 666-67 (1985).
224. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). The Administrative Procedure Act contemplates
review of governmental action or inaction that affects legislatively or judicially created rights and anticipates full standing to those who contest the denial of statutory
interests. See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 667-68.
225. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding full due process rights applicable to the termination of statutorily granted welfare rights); see also, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) (stating that due process may turn on the nature of the private interest
affected, but not its source); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (stating that
protected property interests can be secured by rules and understandings as well as
formal statutory provisions). But cf Lyng v. Payne, 106 S. Ct. 2333, 2343 (1986)
("We have never held that applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them, have a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process
Clause .... "); Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2154 (1986) (asserting that denial of
benefits to an individual who refuses to compromise religious practice in order to become eligible for those benefits poses a less serious free exercise problem than government compulsion to compromise the practice).
226. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
227. See id. at 540-41.
228. Accepting the constitutional identity of legislative entitlements and common
law property rights, one might still attempt to distinguish decisions of enforcement
courts by stressing that they are coercive in a way that other courts are not. Cf. Hart,
supra note 3, at 1386 (discussing "Non-Coercive Governmental Programs" as a special
case). It is true that a judicial directive, such as a bargaining order, "coerces" a party
into taking some particular action, while the denial of a governmental benefit does
not. See Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion" - Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985
DuKE L.J. 542, 559-60 (explaining, inter alia, that coercion refers to constraints to do
something specific). However, it is difficult to understand why this distinction should
make a constitutional difference. If anything, an incorrect denial of a benefit seems
more onerous because it is a direct deprivation of property, whereas coercive orders
only threaten deprivation if particular action is not taken.
As Justice Marshall stated in his eloquent concurring opinion in Heckler v. Chaney:
Th[e] case law recognizes that attempting to draw a line for purposes of
judicial review between affirmative exercises of coercive agency power
and negative agency refusals to act ... is simply untenable; one of the very
purposes fueling the birth of administrative agencies was the reality that
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The Supreme Court, in its Goldberg to Loudermill line of due
process cases, expanded the constitutional protection granted statutory benefits; it did not reduce the protection granted judicially
secured benefits.229 But the expanded procedural protection
promised by these cases has not generally been viewed as protection of an Article III court,2 0 and the equivalence of statutory to
common law benefits makes it considerably more difficult to argue that the modern administrative state permits any per se rules
or presumptions in favor of Article III court review as an element
of due process.
Since Goldberg v. Kelly, 231the Court has developed a bifurcated
analysis for procedural due process claims. A party seeking review must first show that it retains some substantive property
right affected by a Board certification decision. Second, the importance of this retained interest and the decreased risk of its erroneous deprivation brought by review must outweigh the
governmental or public interest in expeditious resolution of the
certification controversy and in the avoidance of administrative
burdens. 232
Employers mounting a due process challenge to restricted judicial review of certification decisions should not even be able to
clear the first hurdle. A strong argument can be made that the
Labor Act abrogates any employer's common law right to make
unilateral decisions concerning its employees' wages and working
conditions; 233 a redrafted Labor Act that expressly restricted judicial review would eliminate any ambiguity. 234 Employees whose
governmental refusal to act could have just as devastating an effect upon
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as coercive governmental action.
As Justice Frankfurter... wrote, any distinction, as such, between 'negative' and 'affirmative' orders, as a touchstone of jurisdiction to review
[agency action] serves no useful purpose.
470 U.S. at 850-51. (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.) (citation omitted)).
229. Professor Jaffe based his argument for expanding a right to judicial review on
a predicted change or enlargement of "highly protected interests." JAFFE, supranote
3, at 388.
230. See, e.g., Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1294-95
(1975) (noting that judicial review in this area has been limited even though administrative procedure statutes and common law seem to require substantive review).
231. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
232. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
233. See supra note 136 and accompanying text; cf. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.
Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 667-68
(1965) (holding that the NMB need not hold full hearings on representational disputes and stating that an employer's interest does not rise "to a status which requires
the full panoply of procedural protections").
234. A statute setting aside an employer's property interest would also abrogate
any claim to a protected liberty interest in being free to set wages unilaterally. Judicially enforcing a bargaining order would of course threaten an employer with contempt, loss of liberty through imprisonment, and loss of property through a fine.
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rights to choose or reject a collective representative have been affected by an unreasonable certification decision should be able to
reach the second test. They should not, however, be able to pass
it. First, courts could not easily hold that due process requires judicial review of administrative decisions affecting employees' interests in having a majority bargaining representative without also
requiring review of administrative decisions on individuals' entitlements to an array of welfare benefits.2 35 Depriving individuals
of these welfare benefits eclipses the uncertain impact of Board
certification decisions on employee rights to choose or reject collective bargaining. Second, the analysis in Part II above suggests
that the public interest in the expeditious resolution of certification decisions outweighs the contribution that judicial review can
236
make to the correct resolution of certification disputes.
A variation on Hart's argument also needs to be addressed. In
an insightful essay critical of Hart's distinction of enforcement
courts, Professor Henry Monaghan contends that Hart has mistakenly focused "on coercion rather than judicial involvement in
thinking about the nature of the judicial duty."2 37 Monaghan interprets Chief Justice Marshall's assertions in Marbury v.
Madison238 that whether Marbury had a legal right to his commission "must be tried by the judicial authority" 239 and that "[i]t is
emphatically the.., duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."1240 Monaghan suggests that the law-declaring duty of
the judiciary exists whenever a plaintiff, either the government or
a private citizen, seeks the assistance of a court with appropriate
However, before enforcement, an employer could be granted full due process, includ-

ing judicial review of whether it refused to bargain, without allowing judicial review
of the determination that there was a bargaining obligation.
235. For instance, the Court held in Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management,
470 U.S. 768, 780, 791 (1985), that there could be no judicial review of administrative
findings of fact on the questions of disability and dependency with respect to the payment of annuities to retired federal workers. Prior decisions upholding the complete
denial of review to executive decisions concerning the dispensation of benefits date
from Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840), to United States v. Erika, Inc.,
456 U.S. 201 (1982). Important federal entitlements, whose dispensation is not subject
to judicial review, include veterans' benefits, see 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982), and federal
workers' compensation, see 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (1982).
236. Raoul Berger has asserted that a constitutional issue is raised by any claim of
administrative arbitrariness, including claims based on general substantive unreasonableness or lack of evidentiary support. See Berger, AdministrativeArbitrariness: A
Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 980-88 (1969); Berger, AdministrativeArbitrarinessand
JudicialReview, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 82-83 (1965). Berger's position has never been
adopted by the modern Supreme Court, and presumably will not be as long as the
Court avoids constitutionalizing all areas of administrative law. Cases Berger cites,
like Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1866), turn on more limited doctrines, such as
the applicability of the intent-based equal protection clause to administrative decisions. See generally Harper & Lupu, FairRepresentation as Equal Protection, 98
HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1264-65 & nn. 223-25, (1985) (discussing the Court's decision in
Yick Wo).
237. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23
(1983).
238. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
239. Id. at 167.
240. Id. at 177.
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jurisdiction. 2 4 1 Monaghan's primary purpose is to explain why the
Marbury dicta is consistent with judicial deference to administrative law making, but his convincing explanation suggests a constitutional problem with the severely limited review of Board
certification decisions advocated above.
Monaghan's reading limits Marbury's relevance for administrative law to undergirding the judiciary's authority to determine the
constraints Congress intended to place on executive or administrative authority.2 4 Judicial deference to administrative law making
is acceptable to the extent that Congress intended the administrative body to have such authority (or for those still scrupulous
about the nondelegation doctrine, rulemaking or policymaking authority). Monaghan's thesis, however, questions the constitutionality of restrictions on judicial review that would eliminate
judicial authority to decide whether the administrative body acted
within the bounds set for it by Congress. Why should an employer, subject to possible judicial enforcement of a bargaining order, not be able to claim a right to review of whether the Board's
certification was consistent with all congressional directives?
The answer, as well as the question, is suggested by Monaghan.
If Congress is persuaded by the policy arguments advanced in Part
II, it can grant the Board authority to designate exclusive bargaining agents that it in good faith believes have the support of a majority of employees, with no directions on how to exercise that
authority beyond those that it wishes to subject to judicial interpretation. Under Monaghan's thesis, such a broad grant of authority would ensure the
constitutionality of the restrictions on review
243
advocated above.
If Congress wished to restrict judicial review of administrative
action as sharply as advocated above, however, it might also wish
to direct the administrative body on how to exercise discretion
that is not reviewed by the judiciary. Congress in fact has enacted
vey specific statutory provisions regulating executive decisions
about the dispensation of benefits that are not reviewable in
court. 2 " In a like manner, Congress might wish to communicate
241. See Monaghan, supra note 237, at 24. Monaghan points out that Marbury,
upon which Hart relies, was itself an action to require a public official to dispense a
benefit. I&L
242. Id at 26-28.
243. This is true unless the nondelegation doctrine is resurrected to strike down
the delegation. Monaghan allows for this limitation in his thesis. Id at 26 & n.155.
244. The federal workers' compensation law, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151 (1982), provides
one example. It is filled with specific substantive and procedural directives including
a detailed compensation table, see 5 U.S.C. § 8107 (1982), but actions of the Secretary
of Labor in allowing or denying a compensation payment are not subject to judicial
review, see 5 U.S.C. § 8128 (1982). Similarly, Title 38 of the United States Code is
filled with detailed provisions concerning the benefits to which American veterans
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the general policies and principles embodied in section 9 to the
Board without empowering the judiciary to create the imbalances
analyzed in Part II. It might wish to do so to both exhort the
Board and establish a yardstick against which to measure Board
decisionmaking. Congress could achieve this compromise by
including the policies and principles in Committee Reports or
other documents of legislative history. Yet, it seems silly to require such a charade because legislative history can be manufactured and can be slipped past the attention of uninvolved
members of Congress more easily than statutory language.
It thus makes sense to resolve the dilemmas created by Marbury's implications for restrictions on judicial review in the same
spirit that Professor Monaghan resolves them in the areas of administrative law making and statutory interpretation. Congress
takes no law-declaring function from the judiciary by restricting
judicial review; instead, it removes the judiciary from a lawmaking role, confining that role to itself and to the executive branch.
The judiciary simply declares and applies legal decisions made by
the administrative body.245 Congress's expectation that the executive agency will exercise discretion in accord with policies that are
explicit in a statute should not render this resolution more problematic. If Congress can assign a relatively unguided range of lawmaking discretion to the executive, free of judicial review as
Monaghan explains, then it should also be able to assign a range of
discretion guided by express directives.
This resolution, moreover, does more than manipulate words to
escape the mandates of a venerated decision. It reflects a view of
the balance between the branches of our federal government that
is consistent with the central message of Marbury - judicial
supremacy over constitutional interpretation. The resolution acknowledges that the judiciary has two substantive bases of authority from which to attack executive action: the Constitution and
congressionally enacted statutes. Congress cannot contain the
first basis, but the second is fully within its control. Congress can
use the judiciary as a check on executive power to any extent that
Congress chooses - including not at all.246 Congress can grant the
executive an unreviewable law-making authority that is within
the substantive limitations of the Constitution. Insofar as Conare entitled. Yet section 211(a) of this Title provides that "the decisions of the Administrator [of Veterans Affairs] on any question of law or fact under any law ... providing benefits for veterans... shall be final and no... court of the United States shall
have power or jurisdiction to review .... ." 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
245. Cf Monaghan, supra note 237, at 27-28 (stating that a court does not abdicate
"its constitutional duty to 'say what the law is' by deferring to agency interpretations
of law: it is simply applying the law as 'made' by the authorized law-making entity").
246. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 601 n.4 (1985)
(Brennan J. concurring) ("Although the essential function of the judiciary is to say
what the law is.... the exercise of this power with respect to the interpretation of
federal statutory law may not be the power that constrains the actions of the Legislative Branch .... It may rather be that the exercise of the Court's power of judicial
review to ensure constitutionality is what restrains the exercise of legislative power."
(citation omitted)).
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gress is denied this power, the judiciary can frustrate such consti-

tutionally acceptable

designs of the political branches of

247
government as those concerning collective bargaining.
Tension seems to exist between this view of the Constitution's
structural balance and the only specifically worded provision sup-

porting judicial control of administrative decision making. The
last sentence in Article III, section 1, which was not directly relied

upon by Hart, states: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,

which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. '248 As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalistpapers, this provision for judicial job and salary security was
included in Article III to ensure the judiciary's independence from
the executive and legislative branches whose power the judiciary
was intended to check. 249 The provision could not serve this function were Congress able to circumvent it by creating non-Article
III, or legislative, courts and appointing judges without tenure or
salary protection, to do the work that would otherwise be done by
Article III courts. Those who view the provision as a limitation on
the authority of administrative agencies contend that such agencies are equivalent to legislative courts whenever they adjudicate
250
cases that could have been decided by Article III courts.
However, the reality of the contemporary administrative state
demands that the meaning of this provision be narrowed. A broad
reading of the provision questions any limitation on the scope of
review given by Article III courts to administrative adjudication,
251
as well as the nonreviewability of any administrative decision.
Even a congressional directive that administrative findings of fact
are to be accepted if supported by substantial evidence constitutes
a qualification of adjudicative authority that might have been
vested in Article III courts. Such a restriction of de novo judicial
review is tantamount to substituting nonindependent legislative
247. Similar analysis suggests why judicial use of the nondelegation doctrine
constituted a usurpation of constitutional power. The doctrine did not serve as a necessary check on executive power because Congress has continuing authority to narrow the executive's discretion with further legislation. Instead, the judiciary could
use the doctrine to frustrate the united, and constitutionally acceptable, will of the
two political branches. For further reasons to applaud the demise of the nondelegation doctrine, see Mashaw, Prodelegationr" Why AdministratorsShould Make Political Decisions,1 J. OF L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91-99 (1985).
248. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1.
249. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 494-95 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
250. See Redish, supra note 3, at 214.
251. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86
n.39 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("Our precedents make it clear that the constitutional
requirements for the exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal .... ").
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courts for Article III courts. A strict interpretation of Article III,
section 1 is incompatible with a modern administrative state dependent upon executive bureaus that narrow the issues in most
public disputes before those disputes can occupy the federal judici252
ary's limited time.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has never interpreted Article III,
section 1 to impede the development of administrative adjudication in this fashion. From its early terms, the Court has approved
adjudication by nontenured federal officials of at least some disputes arising under federal statutes.253 The Court's formal acceptance, in Crowell v. Benson,2M of the constitutional authority of
federal nontenured, administrative officials to play a significant
role in the adjudication of disputes between two private parties
subject to a federal regulatory scheme antedates the passage of the
Wagner Act.255 The Court reaffirmed this authority in Thomas v.

Union CarbideAgriculturalProducts Co.,256 which also approved
Switchmen's. In Thomas, the Court rejected an Article III challenge to a congressional scheme using binding arbitration with
limited judicial review to allocate the costs of registering pesticides with the Environmental Protection Agency between registrants using the same data. 257 Even more recently, in
Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,258 the Court
held that the CFTC could adjudicate state common law-based
counterclaims to reparations claims under the Commodity Ex25 9
change Act.
As narrowed by the Court, the tenure clause should not prevent
restricting review of Labor Board certification decisions.
Although it is difficult to extract a definite set of principles from
the Court's recent treatments of Article III, section 1, it is clear
252. Professor Redish acknowledges that "an absolute construction" of Article IH,
section 1 would require tightening factual as well as legal review of administrative
decisionmaking. Redish, supra note 3, at 227. However, he asserts that "de novo judicial proceedings in the reviewing court" would not be required. Id. Redish's assertion
may make his absolute construction of Article III, section 1 more palatable, but he
offers no principled justification for the delegation to nontenured executive officials
of any discretion over disputes covered by the section. See infra note 265.
253. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840) ("The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we
are quite satisfied, that such a power was never intended to be given to them.");
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). Before Congress began to
vest the federal government with broad economic regulatory power in the last years
of the nineteenth century, our law assumed that the exercise of administrative discretion was not reviewable. See Lee, The Origins of JudicialControl of FederalExecutive Action, 36 GEo. L.J. 287, 295-97 (1948). Mandamus and injunctive remedies were
not available "to correct errors made by administrative officers or agencies in construing the law, much less to correct discretionary action of the type now dealt with as
arbitrary or as being without substantial evidence to support it." Id. at 296 (citation
omitted).
254. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
255. See id, at 50-54.
256. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
257. Id. at 593-94.
258. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
259. Id. at 3252-53.
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that the Court intends to ensure that Congress can utilize nonArticle III decisionmakers in adjudicating disputes generated by
the implementation of its own regulatory schemes. In Thomas,
the Court explained its prior use of a "public rights" exception to
the Article III, section 1 provision as a "pragmatic understanding"
that the "danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced"
when the rights to be adjudicated in an alternative forum are ones
that the political branches have competence to define. 260 Clearly,
such rights include any that could be asserted by any party challenging a Board certification decision. 26 1
The Thomas Court 2 62 contrasted rights created or defined by
federal schemes with rights such as the traditional contractual
rights asserted in NorthernPipeline ConstructionCo. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co. 263 The latter were created by and are still defined by
state common law, because Congress either has no power or has
chosen not to exercise power to redefine them.26 Constitutional
260. See 473 U.S. at 589 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,50 (1932). The plurality opinion in NorthernPipeline suggested that the "public rights" exception should
be available only in suits involving the government as a party, 458 U.S. at 67-68, but in
Thomas the majority, 473 U.S. at 586, as well as Justice Brennan, id at 598, the author
of the Northern Pipelineplurality, rejected this limitation.
The "public rights" doctrine is traceable to Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) (stating there exist "matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is
capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but
which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, as it may deem proper").
261. The Switchmen's Court stated:
The [Railway Labor] Act... writes into law the "right" of the "majority of
any craft or class of employees" to "determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class ....." Congress for reasons of its own decided
upon the method for the protection of the "right" which it created.
320 U.S. at 300-01 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1982)). This language does not
expressly cover any employer "right" to avoid a bargaining obligation. However, even
if such a right remains extant in the face of statutes like the Railway Labor Act or the
NLRA, its elimination as part of such legislation would be within Congress's competence, and it therefore should be treated no differently than employees' rights.
262. 473 U.S. at 585-86.
263. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
264. This contrast is not the same as the distinction between legislatively created
and judicially created rights that the Supreme Court has rejected in the due process
cases discussed above. See supra notes 219-226 and accompanying text. Private rights
that must be protected in an Article III court can be legislatively qualified and transformed into public rights. The Court's interpretation of the tenure clause simply
means that Article III courts must adjudicate rights that have not been made subject
to a federal regulatory scheme; it does not mean that Congress must grant such rights
any greater procedural protection.
The Thomas Court relied on Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), in which the
Court assumed that Article III is still relevant to causes of action created by federal
law to replace preexisting state common law causes of action. 473 U.S. at 587. This
qualification does not affect judicial review of Board certification decisions, however,
because these decisions do not in any way replace analogous common law
determinations.
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rights that the political branches have no competence to compromise present a similar contrast. In spite of the criticisms of some
commentators, 265 this type of contrast preserves the values served
by Article III, section 1 without restricting congressional flexibility to serve constitutionally legitimate goals such as the furtherance of collective bargaining. This compromise ensures that the
adjudication of constitutional issues - as well as criminal, common law, equity, and admiralty disputes historically assigned to
the courts - shall remain with an independent judiciary. But
when Congress perceives that a matter within its competence to
address under a civil regulatory scheme, such as the encouragement of a system of collective bargaining, can best be addressed
with the restricted participation of the judiciary, it is not frustrated from doing so.
265. See Redish, supra note 3, at 204-14; Currie, supra note 3, at 462-64. Professor
Redish attacks Justice Brennan's use of the public-private right dichotomy as 'bizarre," because the dichotomy subjects cases at the periphery of Article III jurisdiction to the tenure clause, while exempting those at the "core." Redish, supra note 3,
at 209. This attack seems both unfair and flawed. Justice Brennan did not use the
public-private right distinction to justify the exclusion from the tenure clause of those
disputes that Redish rightly indicates are the most important under Article III disputes raising serious constitutional claims. Redish, supra note 3, at 224. There is
nothing in NorthernPipeline,or in other Brennan opinions, to suggest that he would
accept final adjudication of constitutional issues by a non-Article M court. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan J., concurring) (stating that nonenforcement decisions violating constitutional rights should be reviewable); Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 (1974) (Brennan, J.) (noting that nonreviewability of constitutional issues would present serious constitutional questions). But cf Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973) (Brennan joining in majority opinion holding
District of Columbia courts can appropriately be Article I courts under special constitutional exception).
Furthermore, it is compelling to argue, as Justice Brennan does in Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83, that because Congress has discretion to not create a public right, or
to protect it by political officials only, it should also have discretion (subject to due
process constraints) to protect it through a quasi-independent tribunal, such as a legislative court or an administrative agency. Contrary to Professor Redish, this argument
does not contradict the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine." Congress, to be sure,
should not be able to condition a benefit on one's willingness to sacrifice preexisting
access to an Article III court, any more than it can condition the benefit on the sacrifice of free expression. By restricting Article III courts' review of all claims to a statutory benefit, however, Congress does not coerce or bribe anyone to give up a right that
exists independently of the benefit.
Moreover, disputes involving state common law rights, although perhaps not the
core of Article III jurisdiction, are appropriate for strict application of the tenure
clause. Such an application preserves from indirect political pressures a realm that
the political branches have not found appropriate or been able to regulate directly.
Professor Redish stresses, quite fairly, that the public-private rights distinction is not
suggested by the words of Article III. Redish, supra note 3, at 213-14. Yet he recognizes that an absolutist, simple reading of the words is inconsistent with the modern
administrative state, and offers two compromises of his own, which are equally without textual support. The first, which would limit the clause to cases involving constitutional issues, id.at 224-26, would not threaten the appropriate balance of power
between the political branches and the judiciary, but it seems unnecessarily narrow.
The second, which would find administrative adjudications acceptable if subject to
"meaningful" review, id at 226-27, is much too uncertain and potentially restrictive of
the important and appropriate power of the political branches.
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Conclusion
The arguments in Parts I and II of this Article, no matter how
compelling on their own terms, probably will not sever the ties of
many American lawyers to the presumption in favor of judicial
review. Some of these ties may derive from recent historical circumstances. 266 Others, however, may reflect a deep and abiding
commitment to the judiciary as a "symbol of government. '267 For
many American nonlawyers and lawyers alike, the judiciary must
have final authority to decide cases because only it determines
what the law must be, as opposed to what policy indicates the law
should be. Doctrines such as nondelegation of legislative authority and the presumption in favor of judicial review, however unnecessary to balanced constitutional government, sit well with
American political culture2 68and the remnants of legal formalism
with which it is entwined.
Whatever the strength of its fabric, however, this culture should
gradually wear thin as we continue to absorb the implications of
legal positivism. As this occurs, we should become increasingly
open to policy arguments, like those made in Parts I and II of this
Article, against permitting judicial review to be a constraint on the
implementation of particular legislative visions.
It should be stressed, of course, that questioning the constitutional or political assumptions underlying the presumption of judicial review does not establish the desirability of sharp restrictions
on review of any particular administrative decisionmaking. Policy
arguments must be made for any restrictions; such arguments can
be persuasive only to readers who share particular values. Furthermore, the persuasiveness of these policy arguments also depends on the concurrence of a series of factors that makes judicial
review especially costly, unnecessary, or ineffective.
The argument for restricting judicial review of Board certification decisions, for example, depends on several factors that may
not often coexist in other settings. Congress intended to invest
266. For example, some ties may derive from an emotional commitment to a judiciary that led the effort to protect certain civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. Others
may derive from acceptance of a need to fashion much administrative law to respond
to the dangers of administrative subservience to regulated industries. See generally
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669
(1975). For an argument explaining why a labor board structured to balance management and union interests is not generally vulnerable to such subservience, see Weiler,
supra note 167, at 210-13.
267. See generally T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1937) (discussing
the ceremonies and theories of social insitutions).
268. The nondelegation doctrine is especially closely related to legal formalism because it assumes that there is some natural, a priori distinction between lawmaking
and law application.
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the agency with broad discretionary authority to achieve a general
goal of selecting majority-supported, exclusive representatives,
and Congress limited that authority with few specific directives.
Further, the delay caused by judicial review presents special difficulties for the continually threatened organizational process upon
which collective bargaining must depend. In part because of this
delay, judicial review necessarily creates an imbalance in the Act
because it cannot be as meaningful for those seeking to expand as
for those seeking to contract collective bargaining. The certification decisions for which review is sought have limited final significance; they cannot impose on a party seeking review any burden
that cannot be escaped within a reasonable period. The continuity
or consistency of agency decisionmaking, moreover, is relatively
unimportant to the achievement of statutory goals. And, finally,
the history and sociology of America suggests that judicial decisionmaking in this area may be askew because collective bargaining challenges both the dominant liberal individualistic ideology
and the class identification of American judges.
In contrast, these factors do not support significant restrictions
on review of Labor Board unfair labor practice decisions. First,
Congress itself has defined what labor practices are to be prohibited. These definitions are often stated in general language; but
even these general definitions do not authorize the Board to formulate its own doctrines to achieve statutory goals. When deciding most unfair labor practice questions, therefore, the Board not
only is constituted as a judicial tribunal, 269 but operates as one as
well. Therefore, it can make no claim of a special policymaking
status. Second, the Board's applications of the definitions do have
great significance to employers and unions. The definitions determine the extent to which employers' managerial discretion is compromised by the labor laws. The definitions also determine to
what extent employee actions to enhance working conditions are
protected from employer reprisals, on the one hand, or are actually prohibited by the government, on the other. Third, because of
this significance, inconsistent applications of the definitions can be
very disruptive. Employers need to know what decisions can be
made unilaterally without bargaining.2 70 Employees fearful of losing their jobs need to know what concerted action will receive gov2 71
ernment protection.
269. Structuring the Board to be more openly political by including contending interest groups - management and labor - might weaken the presumption of judicial
review. On the other hand, it could present a range of new procedural issues, and it
could invigorate arguments against policy making delegation to the Board. See generally A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking
down delegation of policy-making authority not only to an executive bureau, but also
to private trade associations); T. LoWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969) (attacking the
model of government by contending interest groups).
270. Cf. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 684-85 (1981) (noting
that bargaining is disrupted if the scope of mandatory bargaining is not clear).
271. See Estreicher, Policy Oscillationat the Labor Board A Pleafor Rulemaking,
37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 173 (1985) (adapted from remarks delivered at New York Uni[VOL.
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Judicial review of Board interpretations of congressional defini-

tions of unfair labor practices may, on balance, benefit employers.
Employers, who can obtain preliminary relief from serious union
unfair labor practices, 272 benefit more from the delay occasioned
by such review. Any special judicial receptivity to employers' labor relations arguments affects review of unfair labor practices as
well as certification decisions. This imbalance, however, which
would in part be corrected by amending the Act to compel requesting preliminary relief against certain employer unfair labor
practices, 273 does not by itself make a strong case for significant
restrictions on judicial review.27 4
Nevertheless, constitutionally legitimate goals of other statutory schemes probably could be best served by executive regulation that is minimally restricted by judicial review. Certainly
some empirical studies suggest so. 275 Other functional analyses
may be appropriate in other settings. The Supreme Court's rejection, in Heckler v. Chaney,276 of a functional, balancing interpretation of the "committed to agency discretion" exception to judicial
review contained in the Administrative Procedure Act,277 for example, should not restrain legislators drafting other statutes. The
kind of functional analysis employed by lower courts when applying the "committed to agency discretion" exception surely is appropriate for legislators designing the relationship between
versity's 37th Annual National Conference on Labor, June 7, 1984) (criticizing retroactive Board overruling of Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975)).
272. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1982) (covering specific union unfair labor practices) with 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1982) (covering unfair labor practices generally).
273. The contrast between the Act's treatment of preliminary relief for employers
against serious union unfair labor practices and its treatment of relief for unions
against serious employer unfair labor practices, see supra note 272; 47 NLRB ANN.
REP. 314 (1982), is part of a pattern of imbalance in the present system. The law
ensures that employers' legitimate business operations are not victims of the delays of
litigation. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-55 (1970)
(authorizing injunctive relief in addition to damages for strikes in breach of contract);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982) (requiring the Board to seek injunctive relief against
possible illegal secondary boycotts and recognitional picketing). Eliminating unnecessary judicial review of Board certification decisions, as well as requiring preliminary
relief against serious employer unfair labor practices, would grant unions comparable
treatment.
274. But see Friendly, Satisfaction, Yes - Complacency, No!, 51 A.B.A. J. 715, 719
(1965) (advocating that section 8(a)(3) cases be decided by NLRB regional directors
"without review or precedential effect").
275. See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT 343-93 (1983); J. MASHAW, C. GOETz, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHVARTZ, P.
VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALs 146-47 (1978); see

also J.
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185-90 (1983). But see Rabin, Preclusionof

JudicialReview in the Processingof Claimsfor Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1975) (arguing that decisions of the Veterans' Administration should be open to judicial review).
276. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
277. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982).

1987]

agency and court that will most effectively implement a statute.
This analysis directed consideration of the impact of review on the
agency and the courts, as well as the usefulness of judicial review
2 78
in compensating for administrative mistakes.
This Article attempts to suggest further tools for functional
analysis of the appropriate division of authority between the executive and judicial branches of government. At the least, it should
broaden the scope of the debate among those labor law reformers
who are attempting to formulate the most effective strategy to
cure the present malaise of the American labor movement.

278. It was formulated two decades ago by Harvey Saferstein in an influential essay. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968). Saferstein listed several specific
factors, which courts have used. One such factor is the need for expeditious operation
of congressional programs to determine whether an action should be committed to
agency discretion. See, e.g., Suntex Drug v. Block, 666 F.2d 158, 163-66 (5th Cir. 1982);
National Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Local 2855 v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 577-80 (3d Cir. 1979); Greater New York
Hosp. Ass'n v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 494, 497-99 (2d Cir. 1976); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d
1243, 1249-51 (1st Cir. 1970). Saferstein's other factors include expertise and experience required to understand the subject matter of the agency's action, the managerial
nature of the agency, the necessity of informal agency decisionmaking, and the inability of reviewing courts to ensure correct results. See Saferstein, supra, at 377-95.
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